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 Using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and Current Population Survey, 
this work will examine under-reporting of nonfatal workplace injuries and illnesses in 
construction for Hispanics from 1976-2008 at the national level. Previous research 
implemented different methods and techniques to examine the reasons behind under-
reporting of workplace injuries and illnesses, concluding that the current surveillance 
system suffers from a problem of chronic under-reporting. By focusing on Hispanics 
working in construction, and by using different methods to examine to what degree the 
presence of Hispanics at the worksite contributes to the under-reporting of nonfatal 
occupational injuries and illness, our findings suggest that the presence of Hispanic 
construction workers significantly reduces the number of reported injuries. 
 A lagged fixed effect model will be used to investigate the under-reporting issue 
in construction with regard to Hispanics. Usage of this model constituted the first 
departure from previous research that studied under-reporting in which capture-recapture 
and face-to-face interviews were used. The second departure was implementing this 
method in the construction industry. This is the first time a lagged fixed effect model has 
been used to study this phenomenon (under-reporting in construction), while most 
literature about under-reporting has been restricted to manufacturing with some covering 
the overall economy. Lastly, this work is different in its duration and scope: It covers the 
years from 1976 up to 2008 and includes all 50 states and the District of Columbia.  
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 From a base model (without inclusion of Hispanics) we can see that the real 
workers’ compensation rate negatively impacted all types of injury reporting except light-
duty, while union rates, unemployment, wages, and firm size correlate negatively with all 
types of injuries. When Hispanics and their interactions with union rate and workers’ 
compensation rates were included and summed as independent variables, we see that the 
presence of Hispanics leads to a decrease in the incident rate for all types of injuries 
except for light-duty. In other words, the presence of Hispanics leads to lower reporting 
and, therefore, the appearance of lower rates of all types of injury rates except for light 
duty which indicates that Hispanics are under-reported. 
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 While Hispanics are not actually safer construction workers when compared to 
others (we know this because Hispanic construction workers die at a higher rate than 
others), Hispanic workers do appear to be statistically safer than others given that a 
higher percentage or ratio of Hispanic workers to non-Hispanic ones have lower reported 
injury rates.  However, where unionization rates are higher, reported Hispanic injury rates 
are higher, suggesting that unions either protect Hispanic workers’ right to report injuries 
or that unions may select for legal Hispanic workers making them less susceptible to 
under-reporting. Emphasizing that our results capture under-reporting, we find that 
Hispanic workers are “safer” only where workers’ compensation rates are higher. These 
facts taken in aggregate lead to the conclusion that Hispanic construction workers’ injury 
rates are systematically under-reported where the cost of injuries are higher and union 
coverage is lower. 
 Under-reporting is one of the major problems facing the national surveillance 
systems that record injury and illnesses in all sectors of the economy. Under-reporting of 
injuries is a significant but difficult to measure problem in construction as well.  This 
research provides insight into injury under-reporting in construction by focusing on the 
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reporting of injuries for Hispanic workers.  Hispanic workers include a high proportion of 
immigrant workers, many of whom have limited English language skills and who may be 
constrained or hindered by illegal work status.  Such persons, therefore, are among the 
construction workers most at risk for having their injuries go unreported—either due to 
the language barrier or fear of being deported or both.   
 To examine the under-reporting problem in construction using annual, state-level 
construction injury rates by construction subsector over a period of about 30 years, a 
lagged fixed effects model is used to regress overall and subset injury rates against a set 
of demographic, economic and labor market control variables.  The association between 
these variables and injury rates is generally what was anticipated by previous research.  
These control variables, which include the construction unionization rate, account for 
60% of the variation in overall construction injury rates.  Controlling for these factors by 
introducing the percentage of Hispanics working in construction finds that the higher the 
percentage of Hispanics, the lower the reported injury rate.  Controlling for both 
unionization and the percentage of Hispanics, I find that the interaction of unionization 
rate with Hispanic correlates with greater reported injury rates.  This suggests that either 
unions select for less disadvantaged Hispanics (perhaps those who are legal to work in 
the United States and/or those who speak English), or that construction unions serve to 
directly support and encourage the reporting of injuries for Hispanic workers.  While in 
some models the positive correlation between Hispanics and unionization is not 
statistically significant, I find that, having controlled for the workers’ compensation rate 
an interaction obtains between the workers’ compensation rate and the percentage of 
Hispanics is systematically negative and statistically insignificant.  This indicates that 
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where the cost to the employer of injury rates is higher, reported Hispanic injury rates are 
lower.  Under this formulation of the model, the interaction between the percent of 
Hispanics and unionization is positive and statistically insignificant.  On the assumption 
that Hispanic workers are not safer than non-Hispanic workers, the results may be 
interpreted as the follows: 1) Hispanic worker injury rates are under-reported where the 
cost of injuries to the employer is higher, and 2) where union representation is lower.  
The assumption upon which these conclusions rest is supported by: 1) the fact that 
Hispanics have higher death rates in construction, where unlike injury rates, death rates 
are recorded according to ethnicity; and 2) it is implausible that Hispanic workers should 
be safer in situations where injury risks are greatest. 
 This research aimed to test my thesis that: 
Injuries for Hispanic workers in construction are under-reported in general with 
incidences of under-reporting being greater when and where workers’ 
compensation costs are higher and, furthermore, that this under-reporting of 
Hispanic injuries is less when and where union representation is greater. 
 Under-reporting of injuries and illnesses is one of the major problems from which 
national surveillance systems and reporting mechanisms suffer.  Additionally, there arises 
a related problem in determining how to measure it. The evidence compiled from 
academic research and the media proves that under-reporting is a major problem 
confronting both officials and researchers alike. As mentioned previously, academic 
research measuring under-reporting is relatively limited and also only very recent. The 
main conclusion of these studies is that under-reporting is a fact and the magnitude of the 
phenomenon ranges widely, as do the methods and techniques that have been used to 
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gather data. The research of Boden and Ozonoff (2008) concluded that the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS) surveys reported, at most, only 76% of all injuries in the states 
under consideration. While the study conducted by Rosenman et al. (2006) of Michigan 
concluded that the Survey of Occupational Injury and Illness (SOII) missed up to 68% of 
work related injuries and illnesses, Leigh, Marcin, and Miller (2004) argued that the SOII 
missed between 33 and 69% of all work-related injuries and illnesses. A real time 
example of the magnitude of under-reporting came from the construction of Denver 
International Airport (DIA), with a study documenting and comparing what was reported 
by the BLS in relation to the project and the actual number; and what they concluded was 
that the numbers and rates of injuries and illnesses are more than double those published 
by BLS (Glazner et al., 1998). Smith et al. (2005) concluded that injuries with days away 
from work are 1.8 times higher than BLS estimates. Workers’ compensation programs 
are also not immune to under-reporting. Shannon and Lowe (2002) showed that, using 
Canadian survey data, that 40% of injured workers who are eligible did not file for 
workers’ compensation. 
 Under-reporting phenomena can be caused by many factors, and one reason is the 
presence of less advantaged workers who fear being fired, disciplined or their coworkers 
losing rewards. From the standpoint of employers, the main reason for under-reporting of 
workplace related injuries and illnesses has to do with a fear of increasing workers’ 
compensation costs to the diminishing of a given company’s chances of winning 
contracts and bids. Explaining how under-reporting might occur, and why it does, is 
detailed by means of a conceptual filter model. Since reporting and documenting any 
work related injury or illness includes a complex series of steps, this model filters out any 
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accident that does not pass from one stage to the other, which makes it clear how under-
reporting might transpire with certain injuries and illnesses being lost in the 
documentation process (Azaroff, Lax, Levenstein, & Wegman, 2004; Azaroff, 
Levenstein, & Wegman, 2002). 
 Once the under-reporting problem is recognized, tackling the other problem, 
another issue that has recently begun to attract interest of the academic community, is 
how to measure under-reporting.  What renders issues more complicated is trying to 
measure to what extent the ethnic or racial factor contribute to under-reporting in an 
industry dominated by less advantaged workers, and, in this work, we are focusing on the 
Hispanic element in relation to under-reporting in construction. By its nature, 
construction is one of the most hazardous industries and occupations in term of 
workplace fatalities and injuries.  According to the latest report by the BLS (2010d) 
nonfatal occupational injury and illnesses rates declined in 2009 to 3.6 cases per 100 full 
time equivalent workers (FTEW) from 3.9 cases in 2008, which in actual numbers means 
it declined from 3.7 million in 2008 to 3.3 million cases in 2009. For construction, 
occupational injury and illnesses cases declined in 2009 to 4.3 cases per 100 full time 
equivalent workers (FTEW), a rate that is still clearly above the overall national average. 
One the other hand, the BLS reported that fatal occupational injuries for 2009 were 4,340 
cases in the private industry sector as compared to 5,214 cases in 2008, where the 
construction sector had the highest number of cases with 816 or about 19% of the total. 
 The driving force behind the recent interest in quantifying under-reporting came 
as an attempt to explain and understand the trend of declining workplace injuries and 
illnesses in different sectors of the economy. According to the officials of the BLS and 
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other major surveillance systems, the declining trend witnessed in workplace injuries and 
illnesses is due to the increase in safety regulations and higher standards, while some 
researchers attribute the decline to improved record-keeping implemented by 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) agencies.  For example, 
Friedman and Forst (2007) claimed that between 1992 and 2003 the decline in injuries 
and illnesses was occurring after changes in OSHA record-keeping in 1995 and 2001, 
respectively.  Friedman and Forst (2007) concluded that about 83% of the decline could 
be attributed to the changes in OSHA tabulation. There is little doubt that over time 
workplace safety did improve and that standards were implemented more aggressively, 
but can the decline only be explained through and attributed to better safety measures and 
standards in addition to more precise recordkeeping?  
 Since the 1970s, many studies have been conducted in order to predict injury rates 
across the various sectors of the economy.  Differently stated, these have sought to 
ascertain what factors influence or determine injury rates in the economy. Most of this 
research, and at the same time much of the debate, was centered on the relation between 
workers’ compensation and injuries and the question of a negative or positive correlation 
between them. Other control variables are of interest such as demographic factors 
(ethnicity, age, education, gender) as well as market variables (unemployment, unions, 
wages) and industry factors (firm size, hours worked), but the most significant or 
conspicuous among these variables is that of workers’ compensation. Much of the 
aforementioned research focused on the manufacturing industry and mining while other 
industries were ignored.  
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 The frequently studied relation between workers' compensation as determinant of 
injuries and illnesses comes from the fact that with any type of insurance, a moral hazard 
issue will come into play and the behavior of an ideal and perfectly competitive market in 
providing an efficient solution will be in vain. The debate intensifies when it comes to 
separating the reporting effect from the safety effect (wages provide a good indicator of 
the safety effect) of workers’ compensation. Thus, the presence of workers’ 
compensation will not only affect workers’ incentives (through providing benefits), but it 
will also be expected to affect employer’s incentives (through safety). On the surface, 
these two goals seems to be contradictory, where the greater the workers’ compensation 
benefits are the higher the injury rate would be (Butler, 1983; Butler & Worrall, 1983; 
Chelius, 1974; Ruser, 1985). The safety effect of the workers’ compensation relation 
depends on the degree of experience rating of the firm, and typically, the larger the firm 
the higher its experience rating is. What this means is that in bigger firms, the presence of 
the workers’ compensation safety effect will dominate and injury rates will be less 
(McVittie, Baniken, & Brocklebank, 1997; Ruser, 1985, 1991). 
 The evidence is overwhelming for the existence of under-reporting of injuries and 
illnesses in the national surveillance systems. Individual and industrial characteristics are 
among the reasons behind this phenomenon. However, there are some industries with 
certain features that will suffer more than others from under-reporting, as is the case with 
construction.  
 Construction has very unique characteristics that make it more susceptible to the 
problem of under-reporting of injuries and illnesses. That is, construction as an industry 
is highly fragmented and characterized by firms of radically different scale.  In other 
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words, some projects are handled by giant construction companies with hundreds of 
workers; and, conversely, other construction projects are undertaken by companies 
employing as few as two or three workers at the most. According to the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, the U.S. Department of Labor (BLS, 2010a) reports that in 2008 the 
construction industry employed 7.2 million workers in salary and wage jobs with 1.8 
million workers being self-employed or working for family members, and, during the 
same year, there were 884,300 establishments in the nation with about 68% employing 
less than five workers. 
 Construction is one of the most dangerous industries in the economy because of 
its nature. According to the latest report by the BLS (2010d) nonfatal occupational injury 
and illnesses rates for all industries declined in 2009 to 3.6 cases per 100 full time 
equivalent workers (FTEW) from 3.9 cases in 2008; in numbers this means it declined 
from 3.7 million in 2008 to 3.3 million cases in 2009. For construction, occupational 
injury and illnesses rates declined in 2009 to 4.3 per 100 full time equivalent workers 
from 4.7 in 2008.  It is clear that it is still above the overall national average. At the same 
time, injuries with job restrictions or transfers are increasing over time for all industries 
as well as for construction (BLS, 2010d).  One the other side, BLS reported occupational 
fatal injury for 2009 was 4,340 cases in the private industry sector (compared to 5,214 
cases in 2008) where construction has the highest number of cases with 816 cases, or 
about 19% (BLS, 2010b). The data show that over time, the rate of total cases of nonfatal 
injuries and illnesses in construction per 100 full time equivalent workers is declining and 
higher than the rate per 100 full time equivalent workers for all industries for all years.  
For example, in 2007 the rate was 5.4 and 4.2, respectively; it is also true for injuries and 
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illnesses resulting in days away from work, 1.9 and 1.2. Given the previous trends for 
construction compared to all industries, injuries and illnesses with job transfer or 
restriction (light duty) are increasing for construction as well as for all industries over 
time. 
 As is known, Hispanic workers in construction can be said to be over represented 
when compared to other minority groups, and, they tend to be more likely to be employed 
in jobs that are comparatively more dangerous, requiring less-skilled work, and with poor 
work conditions (Menzel & Gutierrez, 2010; Pransky et al., 2002).  At the same time, 
they are covered less than others by health insurance (McCollister et al., 2010), while 
suffering higher rates of fatal- and nonfatal occupational injuries than any other ethnic 
group (Dong, Men, & Ringen, 2010; Dong & Platner, 2004). Given that Hispanics are 
more often exposed to dangerous jobs and at the same time disadvantaged politically, 
economically, and culturally, the chances of reporting any related occupational injuries 
and illnesses will be small.  Azaroff et al. (2002, 2004) developed a filtering system of 
how many injuries will never be reported by injured Hispanic workers.  Their injury 
model explains obstacles to documenting workplace injuries and illnesses to the BLS, 
workers’ compensation, and medical database and shows the steps and channels each 
injury has to go through before being documented and recorded by each of these systems.  
 Hispanic representation in construction is increasing rapidly over time as a 
percentage of all construction workers; Hispanic workers increased from 9% in 1990 to 
24.7% in 2008; this represents an increase of 174% (BLS, 2010c). These trends in 
nonfatal injuries and illnesses in all industries in general, and in construction in 
particular, attract the attention of researchers for their puzzling nature, meaning that some 
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trends—such as total injuries—are apparently decreasing, while others are increasing, 
such as injuries with job transfers or restrictions. 
 These numbers provide a clear indication of how severe the problem of under-
reporting is in general, and in construction in particular, given the typical composition of 
the construction work force where the death rate for Hispanics is higher than the national 
average, while at the same time rates for most injury types are declining except for light-
duty.  This potentially represents a clever way of disguising under-reporting especially 
for vulnerable workers like Hispanics.   
 In this research, the focus is on predicting under-reporting for injuries and 
illnesses in construction in relation to Hispanics and to determine—after controlling for 
numerous factors—how much the factor of the presence of Hispanics in the workforce 
contributes to under-reporting in construction.  
 After implementing a lagged fixed effect model to the panel data set, the results 
were as expected and support my hypothesis.  At the same time the findings are 
consistent with other empirical work that has studied the relation between predicting 
injury rates and different control variables. From the basic model (that predicts injury 
rates without the Hispanic variable or its interaction variables) we see that it can account 
for approximately 50% of injury rate variation of all injury types except for light-duty.  
 The second major finding is the main focus of this dissertation, namely, the 
Hispanic factor as it correlates with injury under-reporting. After introducing the 
percentage of Hispanics and their interaction with union rates and real workers’ 
compensation rates, I found in all cases except light-duty that the higher the Hispanic 
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presence in the industry (construction) the fewer the reported injuries for all types of 
injuries and the more that light-duty jobs were assigned for injured workers. 
 This dissertation consists of six chapters. Chapter II undertakes a review of the 
literature about workers’ compensation history, calculation, and some empirical work 
related to injury determination and workers’ compensation. Chapter III covers under-
reporting of injuries and illnesses and Hispanic fatal and nonfatal injuries in construction. 
Chapter IV furnishes the data and model used, and Chapter V examines the results of this 




Nonfatal Occupational Injuries and Illnesses Trends 
 Given the nature of any job, there is always some degree of potential injury risk 
associated with it, where the more the hazardous a given job is the higher the risk of 
suffering an injury is in the course of work. Work-related injuries and illnesses may be 
seen as byproducts or externalities of economic activity that can be either random or 
deterministic. Put another way, employees and employers share control over events and 
both are affected by the consequences. In the past 4 decades, the overall rate of work-
related injuries and illnesses in the United States has steadily declined, with a few 
exceptions.  Work-related injuries and illnesses that required a job transfer or subsequent 
restrictions, and some minor interruptions of this overall trend, are the only irregularities 
in this overall trajectory. The national monitoring and oversight agency, the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (2010d), found that the rate of nonfatal injuries and illnesses incidents 
among private industry employers in 2007 was 4.2 cases per 100 full time equivalent 
workers, a decline from 4.4 cases in 2006. Figure 1 shows data for the incident rate of 
work-related injuries and illnesses from 1972 onwards. According to this information, the 





Figure 1. Work related injuries and illnesses total cases rates-all industries. 
 Generally speaking, a similar trend can be found in many other occupations and 
industries across the country.  For example, Figure 2 shows that the incident rate for the 
construction sector in 2008 was 4.7 cases per 100 full time equivalent workers, 
representing a decline of 2.4 cases and 8.4 cases for 2002 and 1992, respectively. A 
similar trend also can be found in manufacturing, mining and agriculture, where in 2008 
the incident rate was 5 cases per 100 full time equivalent workers, compared to 12.5 
cases in 1992. 
 The same trend does not hold for the occupational injuries and illnesses that 
required job transfer or the implementation of postinjury restrictions (such as 
specification of light-duty), where the overall trend in almost all industries is sloping 
upward. Figure 3 depicts the above claim of increasing injuries and illnesses case that 































Figure 2. Total cases of injuries and illnesses for selected industries. 
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Figure 4. Cases with days away from work for selected industries. 
 On the other hand, Figure 4 shows the number of days away from work for 
selected industries where the trend has been declining since 1976, which means that this 
decline in injuries that result in days away from work has been absorbed by the cases 
with light duty. Figure 3 shows the increasing cases of light duty or job transfer. Figure 5 
provides a clear picture about the different types of injury and illnesses reported in the 
construction industry over time. The rates of all types of injuries, except those leading to 
light duty, declined.  
 Before proceeding further, one important point about BLS data needs to be 
mentioned (and is further clarified below). One must keep in mind the different 
benchmarks and categories employed. In 2002, the BLS adopted the North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS), while previously, the dominant system was the 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC).  Because of these differences, attention should 


































Figure 5. Construction injuries and illnesses incident rate trends. 
This phenomenon of steadily declining incident rates has attracted the notice of 
numerous economists and policy makers seeking to explain and confirm the data. This 
literature focuses on the theoretical and empirical work related to explanation, while 
works centered on the confirmation or conformity issue are mentioned only briefly. 
 What explains the incident rate trend?  What are the factors driving this 
trajectory? Stated differently, it is uncertain if the incident trend rate is the cause behind 
related factors, or if it is instead the effect of other forces, or perhaps it is both cause and 
effect. The answer to this question is found in analyzing the practice of under-reporting 
and the presence of Hispanics in the workforce.  These two elements taken together are 
the key factors in explaining the overall increasing trend in injuries that required job 
transfer or restrictions (light duty). There is a very substantial body of literature devoted 
to trying to explain the declining trend of occupational injuries and illnesses over time. 
Many works also explore how workers’ compensation rates, that at one time were based 
on a given firm’s experience rating, can somewhat explain this trend. Demographic, 
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economic, and market factors are also introduced in an attempt to clarify any impact they 
may have on that matter. Recognition that under-reporting is a major problem, one that 
plagues national surveillance system organizations and monitoring, is not a new insight. 
Many have also perceived under-reporting’s role as a driving force behind the decline in 
reported occupational injuries and illnesses in a wide array of industries. Scholars have 
only recently attempted to quantify under-reporting as a major factor in this apparent 
decline in the total number of injuries and illnesses in almost all industries.  The new 
approach was born from a belief that improved safety and standards do not seem to 
account for the apparent decline in injuries given the fact that reported fatalities 
increased, and in the case of construction, the job has remained a dangerous one. 
Economic Theory 
 Nearly every job carries the potential for injury, though of course, some jobs are 
inherently more dangerous than others. Work-related injuries and illnesses may be seen 
as byproducts or externalities of economic activity that can be either random or 
deterministic. Put another way, employees and employers share control over events and 
both are affected by the consequences. Seemingly random in the particular, one may still 
predict the likelihood of an injury in general. We may, therefore, assign a risk level to an 
injury, and use the event’s probability to make predictions and improvements to decrease 
the likelihood of an accident. 
 Both employers and employees can take steps to reduce workplace injuries. To 
name only a few examples: Improved technology, protective equipment, and safety 
training may all reduce the risk of injury. Even after every precaution, accidents are 
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perhaps inevitable. While laudable, the goal of an injury-proof workplace is an 
impossible dream.   
 Accidents are costly for all involved.  For the employee, the cost may be tangible: 
the loss of income as a result of missed work days (lost wages), and perhaps medical and 
rehabilitation expenses, especially if complications develop.  For some, chronic pain and 
suffering may linger long after visible wounds have faded. Other consequences are 
intangible, including abiding anxiety over possible future injuries. On the other hand, an 
injury will cost the employer through interruption and delay of the production process, 
damage to equipment and material, and the need to search for a replacement worker. 
Thus, given the costly consequences of an accident, and given that some degree of risk is 
inherent in any job, many turn to insurance policies to offset the expense of accidents. 
Employers often invest in one of the oldest forms of social insurance in existence: 
workers’ compensation. 
 The economic rationale for government control of compensation system stems 
from the idea that the private markets—including the labor market—fail to provide 
optimal levels of safety, protection, and income security in the case of injury accident. 
Evidence abounds to support this contention. Among the reasons underlying this failure 
of the private market is that decision makers do not have complete information about the 
product they are going to buy (information about the risk of being injured in the course of 
work), and so wage differentials (such as those provided for riskier jobs) do not ex ante 
fully compensate the workers for the danger they encounter. For this reason, since he is 
not fully compensated for the riskier job, a worker will have fewer incentives to be 
careful, and in addition, they will not be adequately insured. In other words, if the worker 
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in a risky job is not compensated by higher wages, they will not be careful simply 
because of the danger of sustaining an injury. If, however, the risky job compensates 
workers, they will be more cautious because of the higher financial cost that missed work 
entails. Moral hazard and adverse selection are other reasons for the failure of the private 
market to provide insurance to workers. 
 Risk-averse workers face an economic decision of whether or not to take a 
particular job that unavoidably entails some probability of injury. A worker’s preference 
can be modeled by using Expected Utility Theory. John von Neumann and Oskar 
Morgenstern developed this theory in the 1940s. Economists employ utility theory to 
model rational human behavior about decision-making.  But if certain conditions persist 
or apply (axioms), the utility theory will not function properly unless certain axioms are 
met. The expected utility theory simply states that a rational human or rational decision 
maker facing risky events usually chooses between them on the basis of comparing 
expected utility in the case of each.  
 The idea of rational decision maker (making the best decision given information 
available to them) is not fully accepted by many scholars simply because the condition of 
full or complete information is not satisfied. Critics contend that rational choices by a 
decision maker are not possible—due to this lack of information.  The evidence from 
psychology is overwhelming in suggesting that people do not behave based on the 
standard economic theory assumptions, but rather that they are prone to systematic errors 




 Because injuries are costly to both employer and employee, preventing and 
protecting against injuries—or safety—is of interest for all parties, including policy 
makers. Averting danger, while desirable, requires the allocation of resources that would 
otherwise be used or earmarked for other beneficial purposes (Chelius, 1974). This 
investment in injuries prevention (safety) can be both socially and privately efficient 
when total costs are minimized—where the marginal cost of injury prevention equals the 
marginal benefit.  This gives rise to a situation where the safer the workplace, the more 
attractive it is to the worker. In the case of workplaces that are deemed more dangerous 
by workers the only way for a firm to attract workers is to increase wages, in other words, 
offer compensatory wage differentials correlated to the probability of an accident cost.  
However, most assumptions of economic models, such as the assumption of full 
information about the probability of injury or a frictionless market, are not met so the 
idea of compensating wage differentials to reflect the full cost of probability of an injury 
is questionable (Thomason, 2005).  
 Krueger (1989) modeled safety incentives for both employer and employee in a 
static model. Both parties are presented as rational decision makers who maximize any 
expected utility function in an attempt to quantify the rate of injuries, and evaluate to 
what extent injuries are impacted by the workers’ compensation system as a proxy for 
safety, i.e., for a lower probability of injury. Viscusi and Moore (1987) used the expected 
utility model to study the trade-off between wages and workers’ compensation. Ruser 
(1985) also adopted the idea of workers being risk-averse and their maximization of their 
expected utility of income, when he examined the relation between the increase in 
workers’ compensation benefits and injury rates. 
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 No treatment of the empirical and theoretical literature would be complete 
without a discussion of the first compulsory social insurance program, workers’ 
compensation. This is because of the reciprocal relation between injuries and workers’ 
compensation, and the direction of causality between them, has divided researchers 
between skeptics and supporters of the relation’s existence. 
The History of Workers’ Compensation 
 The introduction of the workers’ compensation program was one of the major 
achievements at the beginning of the 20th century during what came to be known as the 
Progressive Era that roughly spanned the period from 1910 to 1920. It was, and remains, 
perhaps the most progressive, extensive, and wide-spread social program in American 
history. It changed the nature and the dynamics of the workplace, and established the 
basis for later reforms including unemployment insurance, Medicare, and Social Security. 
To obtain a better understanding of the beginning of the workers’ compensation program, 
it is important to understand the tort system it replaced, and to review the history of the 
era in which it originated. 
 Workers’ compensation emerged as a channel through which employer and 
employee costs and the financial burden of injuries could be processed, in a way that 
engendered safer work environments and less costly workplaces. The first compensation 
law was adopted by 11 states in 1911, and it covered only workplace injuries, because 
they were more common than workplace diseases. By 1917, California and 
Massachusetts compensated for workplace disease; however, it was not until 1976, nearly 




 Before workers’ compensation laws were implemented, an injured worker’s only 
legal recourse was to bring a tort or a negligence suit against an employer. Winning such 
a suit, however, was very rare. A worker not only had to prove that the injury was not the 
result of his own negligence, but had to surmount three major rules weighted strongly in 
the favor of an employer as the defense in a trial. Additional weapons used by employers 
against litigiously inclined injured workers required the employee to prove that the injury 
had not occurred as a result of: 1) negligence of fellow servants or employees; 2) the 
knowing assumption or presumption of potential risk by employees; and 3) contributing, 
if not complete, negligence on the part of the injured worker or workers (Chelius, 1977).  
Medical payments and lost wages already placed a tremendous financial burden on 
injured workers, and those seeking legal recourse could be certain only of added 
expenses. The worker assumed the financial burden of taking the tort case to court, even 
when vindicated by the ruling. 
 The workers’ compensation system was intended to overcome the shortcomings 
of the tort or “negligence” system approach. Workers’ compensation provided cash 
benefits and medical and rehabilitation expenses for those suffering from work-related 
injuries or illnesses, regardless of who was at fault.  In return, the employer’s liability 
was limited. A worker, once compensated, surrendered his right to sue his employer. The 
legal philosophy that prevailed at the inception of the workers’ compensation system had 
a lasting influence on the program. For instance, each state has its own compensation 
laws because of the prevailing legal opinions of the time. The United States Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the Constitution’s Commerce Clause curbed Congress’s ability 
to regulate matters not directly involved in interstate commerce. Thus, the federal 
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government was responsible for providing workers’ compensation for interstate 
commerce including the transportation industry (railroad), and its own employees. On the 
other hand, because private, state, and local government workers were not covered by the 
federal insurance, their insurance was the responsibility of the states. States found that 
they needed to enact suitable statutes (Burton, 2007). 
 As mentioned, the workers’ compensation system is a state-level, no-fault, 
compulsory system in most states except Texas. The system’s primary purpose is 
covering medical and rehabilitation costs, and providing partial compensation for wages 
lost wages as the result of an injury. An added intent of the program is to internalize costs 
of injuries and illnesses. This will, theoretically, motivate employers to improve safety 
and health standards. Another objective is to spread costs by risk-sharing through 
insurance pooling. Most states usually compensate two-thirds of previous wages, based 
on state wage average bounded by maximum and minimum caps. A standard practice is 
to cover all medical costs, after a waiting period of between 3 to 7 days. 
 It is the responsibility of the employer to provide benefits to employees, and there 
are three different mechanisms through which an employer may provide these benefits: 1) 
by purchasing insurance from the state; 2) by purchasing insurance from a private carrier; 
or 3) by being self-insured. Different states have different insurance arrangements. 
Nineteen states, including Utah, Arizona, and California, make available all three 
approaches in a scheme known as a “competitive state fund.” Five states, including Ohio 
and Washington, operate under systems of state-funded insurance, where private 
insurance is prohibited. This type of scheme is known as the “monopolistic state fund,” 
even though three of the states that utilize this system do permit employer self-insurance. 
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Finally, the remaining 27 states, and the District of Columbia, allow employers to 
purchase insurance from private carriers or to self-insure (Burton, 2007). 
 There are different types of cash benefits provided by the workers’ compensation 
program to injured or diseased workers. Claims can be categorized as follows: 1) 
Temporary Total Disability Benefits (TTD); 2) Uncompensated Medical Expenses; 3) 
Permanent Partial Disability Benefits (PPD); 4) Permanent Total Disability Benefits 
(PTD); and 5) Death Benefits. Cash benefits in all states are not subject to either state or 
federal tax, and there is also wide variance among states on issues of maximum weekly 
benefits as well as the duration of benefits payments (Worrall & Appel, 1985). 
 These indemnity incentives affect workers and employers in different ways. For 
workers, these benefits decrease the cost of injury. Ignoring any presumed desire for 
personal safety, workers may exhibit decreased vigilance, a phenomenon known as a 
“risk-bearing moral hazard.” The other side of the equation is that given the generosity of 
workers’ compensation benefits, the likelihood of workers filing more claims (whether 
real or fraudulent) will increase, and this is known in the literature as a “claim-reporting 
moral hazard.” Thus, given that it reduces the cost of workplace injury, we can expect the 
wage differential to decrease as well, yet this is an empirical issue that needs to be 
evaluated. The question of how workers’ compensation affects employer’s incentives 
regarding workplace safety reduces, at least partially, to the question of the correlation 
between workers’ compensation cost premiums and benefits. 
 The way premiums (insurance pricing) are calculated has changed since they were 
introduced in 1911. For decades after, insurance pricing was highly regulated and an 
administrative pricing approach was used. All that began to change in the 1980s.  A wave 
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of deregulation swept over many sectors of the economy, including the workers’ 
compensation program.  Since then, the administrative pricing approach is no longer the 
dominant one in the United States. It is informative to look at how premiums were 
formerly calculated under the administrative pricing approach. 
 This approach is based on several steps. In each state a rating organization, 
usually the National Council of Compensation Insurance (NCCI), was set up. The body 
was tasked with providing an industrial and occupational insurance classification system, 
a system broad enough to encompass any industry. This organization collected 
information from private carriers about benefits and premiums within the state. The 
council used these data to establish pure premiums for each industrial classification 
which covered cash benefits, medical expenses, and loss-adjustment expenses. Pure 
premiums were then increased by a loading factor (accounting for commissions, profits, 
and administrative expenses) to produce manual rates for each classification. For states 
utilizing a manual rating, the loading factor is approximately 35 to 40% of the manual 
rating, and typically the manual rating is expressed as a dollar amount per $100 payroll. 
These findings still required the approval of the state insurance commissioner 
(Thomason, Schmidle, & Burton, 2000). 
 The amount paid by the worker is not always the product of manual rates 
multiplied by the payroll because of modification factors such as the experience rating for 
large- and medium-sized firms based on their previous work record and premium 
discounts for large firms with an annual premium over or above a specified amount.  
Another feature of this system was that most carriers paid dividends to stockholders 
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based on their underwriting experience, which was usually paid at the end of the policy 
period. 
 Under this scheme, because each carrier must begin a given policy period with the 
same manual rates, the chances for competition between different carriers at the 
beginning of a policy period was impossible. Deregulation of the insurance market 
brought with it a new flexibility regarding the manual rate. The change enabled private 
carriers to compete with one another, right from the outset of a given policy period. 
Additionally, many states have allowed competitive rating, deviation, and schedule rating 
as other forms of deregulation (Burton, 2007). 
 One of the major reforms of the workers’ compensation program came in the 
wake of the 1972 Report of the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation 
Laws. Representatives from industry, labor, state and federal government investigated the 
status of the various compensation programs in every state. Based on the findings of this 
committee and concern over deteriorating workplace safety, nineteen essential reforms or 
changes were recommended. Many states followed the commission’s recommendations 
wherever they expanded, changed, and improved their programs in accordance with the 
recommendations that could be generalized as ones increasing the coverage benefits in 
kind and in volume for all workers.  
 The changes increased benefits to workers and employers’ expenses. Between 
1972 and 1979, cash benefits increased from 39.6% to 50.4%, and benefits as a 
percentage of payrolls increased from 0.67% to 1.01%. Simultaneously, employer cost 
increased from 1.11% to 1.95% during the same period as an indication of state 
compliance with the recommendations of the commission (Thomason et al., 2000). 
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 Developments during the 1980s and early 1990s paved the way for later reforms. 
For a brief time in the 1980s, workers’ compensation costs were low, but this soon 
changed. Workers’ compensation costs, beginning in the mid-1980s, rose on average 
11.9% per annum / per state. Costs increased from 1.66 as a percentage of payrolls in 
1984, to 2.16 in 1991. The same trend can be found in benefits, where they increased 
from $18 billion in 1984 to $40.8 billion in 1991, which represents an average annual 
increase of 12.4%. Medical care costs during these years also increased, following the 
same trend. 
 These developments during the 1980s and early 1990s were fueled by employer 
concerns over increasing compensation costs and benefits, which subsequently led to 
another wave of reform that pervaded the 1990s. The main features of the 1990s reforms 
undertaken by many states aimed to overturn the changes of the previous decade. These 
changes sought to contain costs and benefits—after these had been liberalized during the 
previous decade. Medical costs, which had skyrocketed during the previous decade, were 
specifically targeted under the new regulations. The developments in the latter half of the 
1990s can be summarized as follows: 
1. Reduction in the statuary level of cash benefits that took place in some states, 
especially with regard to Permanent Partial Disability (PPD). 
2. Changing rules of compensability (with more restrictive rules governing benefit-
eligibility). 
3. Transformation of the health care system and the introduction of managed care. 
4. The rise of disability managements. 
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5. Remedy doctrine (workers’ compensation benefit program) was exclusively 
challenged by courts because of the increased limitations on the availability of 
benefits (Spieler & Burton, 1998). 
 Costs and benefits declined during the same period, perhaps as a result of 
declining rate of injuries and illnesses. The labor market’s expansion, where economic 
growth reduced national unemployment rates substantially, is another key factor in the 
diminishment of costs and benefits (Thomason et al., 2000).  As a result of these 
developments (reforms), the cost of workers’ compensation as a percentage of payrolls 
declined from 1.66 in 1992, to 1.08% in 1998.  
Empirical Work 
 After this brief history of workers’ compensation it is important to see how this 
was incorporated into economic theory and how it was modeled so that empirical work 
can be conducted and the theory’s validity can be tested. Figure 6 shows the trends in 
workers’ compensation (WC) rate (measured per $100 payroll) and the rate of total cases 
of injuries and illnesses per 100 full time equivalent workers (FTEW) in construction 
during the period from 1976 to 2008. Tracking the rate of injury and illness and workers’ 
compensation rate over time was the focus of a huge amount of research. Empirical and 
theoretical work has been done in attempts to investigate whether changes in workers’ 
compensation rates will influence changes in injury rates. 
Most of this work focused on workers’ compensation as the decisive variable in 
explaining changes in injury rates and other trends. Some supported the positive relation 
between workers’ compensation and injuries, while other researchers supported the idea 




Figure 6. Workers’ compensation and injury and illnesses rate in construction. 
 Theoretically, the analysis of the impact of change in workers’ compensation cost 
and benefits and the rate of workplace-related injuries can be modeled by resort to 
neoclassical economic theory where the laissez faire principle is at the crux. Neoclassical 
economic theory envisions a perfectly competitive labor market where workers have full 
information about risk of employment and costs of accidents for each job, and also a 
system where workers are free to move between jobs. Given that they are rational 
decision makers, workers are assumed to seek to maximize utility. In this idealized 
model, because workers are supposedly free to move between hazardous and 
nonhazardous jobs, an employer who exposes employees to hazards must pay higher 
wages to attract workers. Potential hazards are thus offset by lucrative incentives. In other 
words, if we are assuming that workers positively value their expected earnings and view 
negatively the probability of being injured in certain jobs, we would expect that workers’ 
movement between jobs would be based on an optimal combination of earning (wage 
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all workers have the same preference, firms offering employment with a higher risk of 
being injured can be expected to pay higher wages than those offering lower-risk jobs. In 
turn, this means that mobility between jobs will lead to a wage differential that is fully 
compensated (Burton & Chelius, 1997; Ehrenberg, 1988). 
 One the other side of the equation, employers and firms will be expected to make 
choices according to what they perceive to be in their best interest. Some may opt for the 
wage rate-risk combination of injuries, or they may invest in safety to the point where the 
marginal cost of injury reduction (which includes recourses devoted to accident 
prevention) equals the marginal benefit of the injury reduction (including lower wages, 
reduction of lost production time, less training and reduced hiring new worker). In other 
words, in this model, equilibrium can theoretically be reached through investment and 
allocation of recourses where marginal expenditure on safety equals the marginal 
reduction in risk from this investment.  
 Given this theoretical framework, if the workers’ compensation premium is 
calculated based on perfect experience ratings, or in other words, if the premium is based 
on the firm’s past history of claims rather than a manual rating, then: 
…it would not affect the injury rate at any firm. Rather, because workers’ 
compensation benefits would now compensate workers if they were injured, 
smaller compensation wage differentials would be required to attract workers to 
firms with high injury rates. Thus higher workers’ compensation benefits should 
lead to lower wages at each firm. Workers’ compensation benefits would not 
affect the injury rate that was optimal from each firms’ perspective, since the 
reduction in wage costs would be offset by the new workers’ compensation costs. 
(Ehrenberg, 1988, p. 75) 
 In other words, “under fully experience rated employer [must] bear the full cost of 
accidents, either in the form of ex ante wage premium or in the form of ex post 
compensation benefits” (Thomason & Burton, 1993, p. s7). In this idealized world (the 
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employer fully responsible for the accident costs) accident rate prevention motivations by 
both workers and employers will lead to contradictory results under different insurance 
arrangements. Because the employer is fully responsible for compensating workers in 
case of injury, and because wage differentials in such an event are not fully compensated, 
the marginal cost of any accident rate will increase in tandem with workers’ 
compensation benefits. An employer would therefore have more incentive to allocate 
added resources to prevent accidents, so that injury rates will decrease. These expenses 
would be a reasonable investment, because higher benefits would be offset by lower 
wages. Because the employer is fully responsible for injury costs, the motivation to 
prevent injuries will increase so that the injury rate would likely decline.  
 However, firms are not all perfectly experience-rated; some are manually-rated. 
One must therefore consider how this theory will deal with firms that are incorrectly 
rated.  
 Since firms are not perfectly experience-rated, they are not fully responsible for 
bearing the full cost of ex post compensation, because premiums (costs) are determined 
in part by the accident rate of all the firms of the same industrial classification, so that 
each firm exerts a marginal effect on the cost of the insurance rate.  
 An employer is not fully responsible for ex post compensation under this system. 
Therefore, the wage reduction resulting from the workers’ compensation benefits will be 
more than the employer’s liability for benefits. Based on this, the marginal benefit of 
accident prevention will fall, and fewer resources will be allocated to accident prevention 
with the anticipation that injury rates will increase. In reality, most firms are not perfectly 
experience-rated, and this will lead to higher injury rates: “injury rate should therefore be 
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positively related to compensation benefits as workers respond to higher benefits by 
taking greater risks on the job” (Thomason & Burton, 1993, p. s8). 
 Different arrangement of workers’ compensation leads to contradicting results: 
…from the employer side of the labor market, then, the effect of the workers’ 
compensating system or higher workers’ compensation benefits on resources 
employers devote to reducing work injuries, and hence injury rate, is ambiguous. 
If wage differentials do fully compensate workers for the risk of injury and the 
system is imperfectly experience rated, the injury rate may actually increase. If 
wage differentials are not fully compensated and the system is perfectly 
experience rated, the injury rate will decrease. (Ehrenberg, 1988, p. 76) 
 As Kaufman (1997) and Dorman (1996) have noted, this theoretical analysis has 
been criticized on numerous different grounds, ranging from the theoretical to the 
empirical. In any event, it is clear that the particular workers’ compensation arrangement 
and how premiums are calculated are very important in determining the relation between 
rate of injuries and different characteristics of the industry and some other demographic 
variables.  The only way to investigate the variables and phenomenon under study and to 
eliminate any apparent contradiction is to conduct empirical analysis. 
 The aforementioned theoretical relations have been the object of much empirical 
analysis, and this relation has been under extensive scrutiny since 1972. In that year, the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) started collecting data from each state, and for each 
industry, on the frequency and severity of reported injuries. From the theoretical 
discussion above, it can be ascertained that the incident rate depends on the actions of 
both workers and employers. Injury rates, therefore, are impacted not only by the level of 
benefits, but how the experience rating has been used in calculating premiums. Empirical 
studies have approached this issue from a variety of angles. 
 Using injury data for 2,627 manufacturing establishments in 13 states for 1967 
(cross section), Chelius (1974, 1977), who in a 1977 study analyzed homogeneous 
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industries in 18 states. Using a two-stages least squares technique, Chelius found a 
positive association between injury rates (measured by frequency rates, severity rate, and 
serious injury frequency rate) and workers’ compensation benefits (evaluated for the laws 
in effect in 1967 at several wage-levels). He concluded that, “Increases in the proportion 
of employee accident costs covered by the firm had the effect of increasing injury rates” 
(Chelius, 1974, p. 714). This indicated that, “higher workers’ compensation benefits are 
not associated with lower injury rates. On the contrary, higher benefit-levels were 
associated with higher injury rates” (Chelius, 1977, p. 46).  
 Using state-level claims and injury data for manufacturing industries in 36 states 
from 1972 to 1975, Chelius (1982) reached different conclusions: 
higher compensation benefits are associated with lower severity rate of injury, 
suggesting that higher benefit induce employers to spend more on prevention of 
serious injuries. On the other hand, higher benefits are also associated with higher 
frequency rates of injuries, suggesting that higher benefits induce employees to 
take less care in preventing less serious injuries. (p. 235) 
In a later study of 28 states, Chelius drew similar conclusions. From 1972 to 1978, he 
found that a positive association between higher benefits and frequency rates of injuries 
persists. Unlike his earlier study, he found that benefits impact the severity of injuries.   
 Butler (1983) studied 15 different industries in South Carolina over 32-year 
period. Using the two stages least square method, the same pattern of positive association 
was found between the workers’ compensation benefits and different measures of injury 
rates. Butler and Worrall (1983) results are also consistent with the neoclassical theory 
that positive association between benefit levels and injury rates (temporary total and 
permanent partial disability). The sample the authors analyzed consisted of 35 states from 
1972 to 1978, and they found that “injury claims increase as wages fall and as benefits 
increase” (Butler & Worrall, 1983, p. 586).  
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 Ruser’s (1985) results also supported the positive correlation between injury rates 
and benefits. His analysis of outcomes for 25 manufacturing industries in 41 states from 
1972 to 1979 is consistent with the hypothesis of a positive relation. Worrall and Appel 
(1985) concluded that injury severity increases when compensation benefits increase.  
Krueger’s (1989) analysis found a positive relationship between benefits and claims. The 
longer the waiting period before collecting benefits, the less likely a given claim was to 
be reported:  “a 10% increase in temporary total benefits will lead to a 4.6%-6.7% 
increase in recipiency” (p. 21). Furthermore, “if the waiting period increased from three 
to seven days, the workers’ compensation recipiency rate would fall by 38.7%” (Krueger, 
1989, p. 23). Butler and Worrall (1985) obtained results about the effect of benefits on 
duration where “a 10% increase in benefits could increase the average claim duration by 
0.23 weeks” (p. 722). 
 Kniesner and Leeth (1989) examined the link between labor market outcome and 
workers’ compensation insurance using a numerical simulation of early 1970s data. They 
considered whether workers’ compensation benefits influenced the reporting of injuries 
and illnesses. They concluded that “our numerical simulation demonstrates that increases 
in the WC benefits generally raise reported workplace injuries, but reduce the actual 
number of workplace injuries” (Kniesner & Leeth, 1989, p. 292). 
 Most of the above studies selected the timeframe for analysis beginning from 
1972 onwards because of an important report published that year (National Commission 
on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws, 1972) that recommended more liberal policies 
in terms of workers’ benefits.  
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 On the other hand, Ruser (1991) demonstrated the positive correlation between 
injuries and workers’ compensation benefits and its consistency with the theory.  He 
stressed the importance and impact of experience ratings where: “larger, more 
experience-rated firms internalize a greater portion of the costs of the benefits paid to 
their own injured workers.  Hence, they have a greater incentive to increase safety when 
benefits increase” (Ruser, 1991, p. 347). His results are based on ordinary and weighted 
least square calculations, where he used a longitudinal micro data set of 2,788 
manufacturing establishments, including benefits and employee size measures for the 
period from 1979 to 1984. The same results are obtained in an indication that large firms 
are more highly experience-rated than small ones.  As Butler and Worrall (1983), Ruser 
(1985), and Hirsch, Macpherson, and Dumond (1997) all found, large firms with higher 
experience ratings provide greater incentives to reduce claims. 
 Many other studies investigated the effect of different job and demographic 
characteristics on injury rates.  For example, Boden and Ruser (2003) analyzed the effect 
of changes (reform) in workers’ compensation (medical provider) and reported injury 
rates by using BLS workplace injury microdata from 1987 to 1997. They found that 
limiting a worker’s choice of medical providers made it more difficult to file claims, 
leading to a decline in claim rates.   
 Hirsch et al. (1997) examined the relation between unions and compensation 
claims. They turned to individual panel data based on the March Current Population 
Survey from 1977 to 1992. Their primary finding was that unionization has a substantial 
effect on indemnity claims—meaning that union workers are more likely than nonunion 
workers to receive benefits from workers’ compensation. Furthermore, a worker’s 
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personal characteristics clearly influence his benefits. For example, a Hispanic worker 
exhibits a probability of recipiency that is 13.1% lower than the rate for non-Hispanics. 
The same study also found that compensation claim rates for women are less than those 
for men.  
 How unions impact the rate of injuries is a fraught topic. Advocates and 
opponents of unions often personalize the issue. Partisans issue strident claims that 
conflict with the equally shrill assertions of the opposing side. Despite the cacophony, 
there is no decisive or unambiguous answer to the question of whether the presence of 
unions increases or decreases injury rates. Nor is the correlation between unions and 
workplace safety unequivocal. Stated differently, it is not clear if the presence of unions 
increases the likelihood of workers filing injury claims, or whether unions encourage 
them to do so. Taylor (1987) reexamined the relation between unions and workplace 
safety based on data for 26 industries between 1975 and 1983. This study, the first of its 
kind, showed the relation between the degree of unionization and its effect on the rate of 
incidents. Taylor declared that the relation between workplace safety and unionization is 
more complex than generally believed. The clearest outcome of the study was that “the 
average number of lost workdays associated with these more serious injuries increases in 
direct proportion to the degree of unionization” (Taylor, 1987, p. 450). Taylor’s results 
would seem to provide clear indication that industries which are highly unionized are 
more likely to report workplace related injuries and illnesses when compared to non-
unionized or less-unionized industries.   
 In a British-based study, Fenn and Ashby (2004) examined the relation or the 
influence of unions on workplace risks.  They found that the presence of unions in the 
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workplace will increase the probability of reporting these injuries and illnesses, where 
“establishments with a higher proportion of unionized employees, and with health and 
safety committees, were associated with higher number of reported injuries and illnesses” 
(Fenn & Ashby, 2004, p. 461). The most important conclusion from the aforementioned 
empirical research is that the correlation between the presence of unions and workplace 
nonfatal injuries and illnesses is positive in most cases.  
 All these studies seek to explain why it is that injury rates correlate highly with 
workers’ compensation benefits. Among the explanations these studies offer, workers 
may respond to higher benefits by agreeing to work in riskier jobs, and the higher the risk 
the higher the probability of injury (workers are willing to take an ex ante risk that results 
in ex post injury-risk bearing moral hazard). Another possibility is that higher benefits 
may increase employee incentive to report more claims than might otherwise have 
pertained to an under-reported claim-reporting moral hazard (Butler, 1991). 
 Virtually all of the above mentioned empirical work finds that the accident rate, 
where different proxies such as claim severity and claim frequency have been used, 
increases as workers’ compensation benefits increase.  Simply put, they show the positive 
relation between workers’ compensation and injury rates.  The evidence came from both 
individual and aggregate data. Butler (1994) used two different data sets to analyze the 
relation between benefits and injuries. He found a significant correlation between both 
severity and frequency of claims and benefits increase.  He linked these to decreases in 
the waiting time for the disbursement of benefits. He offered a concise explanation for 
the upward trend in workers’ compensation claims by asserting that they are a result of 
two forces: “changes in the program itself—particularly in benefit levels and the waiting 
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period—and changes in workforce demography—amount of risky employment and 
among the oldest and youngest” (Butler, 1994, p. 399). 
 These studies do not suggest that workplace safety is worsening. On the contrary, 
part of the problem has to do with the inevitable fact that an insurance program will 
introduce the issue of moral hazard.  In the context of this analysis such are termed 
“report- claiming moral hazards,” where workers are more likely to report injury claims 
when benefits are more liberal. One the other hand, and depending on the degree of 
experience-rating, higher benefits will increase the incentive on the part of firms to 
reduce “risk-bearing moral hazards” to minimize insurance costs, and thus injury rates 
will decrease resulting in greater workplace safety.   
 The above analysis of the relation between injury rates and workers’ 
compensation benefits, among others, is only one of the explanations of why injury rates 




 The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 requires almost all private sector 
employers to keep record of workplace related injuries, illnesses and fatalities, and the 
Department of Labor to collect and compile accurate data on occupational injuries 
illnesses and fatalities. However, officials of both the Department of Labor and the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) consistently claim that injuries, 
illnesses and fatalities related to the workplace are declining—a contention which 
naturally would serve to demonstrate the efficacy of their programs in preventing 
workplace injuries illnesses and fatalities. In contrast to these claims, many academic 
researches as well as media reports have shown that work related injuries and illnesses 
are chronically underreported.   
 Both employers and employees to some extent can control the risk of an accident 
occurring through such measures as providing safer work environments through 
introducing safer technology, providing protective equipment and training, even though 
some incidents will still inevitably occur, and a 100% injury-proof workplace is next to 
impossible. In the eventuality of an accident it is a costly occurrence for both employer 
and employee, where the cost to the employee will either be tangible as with a 
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loss of income resulting from lost work days and wages, to say nothing of medical and 
rehabilitation expenses, especially in case of injuries that develop subsequently, or 
intangible injuries such as pain and suffering resulting from injury and anxiety over 
potential future injury. Injury for the employer represents costs in interruption and delay 
of the production process, damage of equipments and materials, and searches for 
replacements, where some studies estimated the total cost of fatal- and nonfatal injuries in 
construction at $11.5 billion in 2002 (Waehrer, Dong, Miller, Men, & Haile, 2007).  At 
the same time the cost of nonfatal injuries in construction among Hispanics in 2002, 
using Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, was $291 million (Dong et al., 2010). For these 
reasons, given the costly consequences of an accident and also that any job presents some 
level of risk of employee injury, usually the behavior of both the employer and employee, 
also the economic incentives for both are of great significance in determining whether or 
not to report any incident. The dynamics of the relation between employer, employee as 
well as the presence of economic- and demographic factors exert a major impact on 
injury determination.  
 Our research focuses on discussing how the presence of Hispanics in construction 
will contribute to the presence underreporting of injuries. Workers’ Compensation (WC) 
and Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) annual Survey of Occupational Injuries and 
Illnesses (SOII) are the most two important monitoring agencies in the Unites States, but 
despite the comprehensiveness of their efforts, there is evidence of underreporting of 
work injuries, and although this problem was recognized a long time ago, quantifying it 
has been relatively recent.  
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 Conway and Svenson (1998) explain the decline in injury and illness rates in the 
1990s as a result of: 1) employment shifts away from hazardous industries; 2) 
underreporting of injuries and illnesses; 3) workers’ compensation reform; 4) industry 
recognition of hazards; and 5) OSHA measures to increase compliance. It is clear that 
underreporting was one of the causes for the trend in decline in injuries and illnesses over 
time among others, and the disincentives to report work-related injuries and illnesses has 
to do with the OSHA recordkeeping program on one side, and company characteristics 
(employer incentives) and worker characteristics (employee incentives) from the other 
side. 
 According to the BLS (2010d), there were 3.7 million private industry injury- and 
illness cases reported in 2008 as compared to 4 million cases for 2007. Even though these 
numbers are high, they still suffer from underreporting that according to some researchers 
led to the decline in the injuries rate over time. In 1987 the BLS conducted a pilot study 
to test and compare different recordkeeping systems including medical records, workers’ 
compensation reports, OSHA logs, and other types of workplace records. The study 
encompassed 200 manufacturing establishments that employed more than 10 workers in 
Massachusetts and Missouri, and for these approximately 4000 cases of injury and illness 
were recorded. The study uncovers evidence of underreporting as well as over-reporting, 
with the underreporting cases being split between cases with- and without lost work time. 
About 10% of total injuries and illnesses were underreported and about 25% of injuries 
with lost workdays suffered from underreporting in these establishments (Eisenberg & 
McDonald, 1988). This study is an early indicator of quantitative evidence for how 
chronic and persistence the underreporting problem is.  
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 Some scholars have tried to explain why the national monitoring system suffers 
from this problem while others have attempted to quantify it. Here, initially, the academic 
research that quantified underreporting will be examined before assessing the other 
primary trend in the literature which discusses the reasons underlying underreporting. 
 Boden and Ozonoff (2008) examined two major sources that report injuries and 
illnesses (BLS-SOII- and workers’ compensation). They studied six states (Minnesota, 
Wisconsin, New Mexico, Oregon, Washington, and West Virginia) from 1998 to 2002 by 
using a capture-recapture method–a technique used in epidemiology. They found that the 
workers’ compensation system missed over 180,000 lost-time injuries for the six states, 
while the BLS system missed about 340,000 cases and about 69,000 injuries were 
underreported in the case of either system. These results showed that the Survey of 
Occupational Injuries and Illnesses (SOII) which is under the BLS suffers more than does 
the workers’ compensation system from the underreporting problem. In a different study 
Friedman and Forst (2007) used Trauma Registry data for Illinois from 1995 to 2003 to 
estimate the number of workers who suffered work-related injuries in the state and 
compared to the numbers reported by the BLS. The advantage of this system--Trauma 
Registry of Illinois-- is that it does not depend on self- (employer) reporting as does the 
BLS, so the numbers reported have a higher probability of being accurate. They found the 
rate of workplace injuries in Illinois was steady over this period in contrast to the BLS 
reports that suggested the rate for the same period for the state declined by about 37.4%.  
In other words, the Trauma Registry figures suggest an anomaly in the realm of reporting 
and not an actual decrease in injury rate.  
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 A different study by Rosenman et al. (2006) for the state of Michigan examined 
five different systems for injury and illness data including BLS (workers’ compensation;  
the OSHA annual survey; the OSHA integrated Management Information System; the 
Occupational Disease Report; and the SOII of the  BLS) from 1999 to 2001. They 
concluded that SOII missed up to 68% of the work-related injuries and illnesses that 
occurred annually in Michigan, and they also estimated that BLS records captured only 
33% of injuries and about 31% of illnesses. From this sort of data it is clear that 
underreporting is a major problem pervading the entire national monitoring system as 
whole—a system that collects sensitive data upon which major research and public 
policies depends. Morse, Dillon, Warren, Hall, and Hovey (2001) and Morse et al. (2005) 
implemented capture-recapture methodology to investigate the underreporting problem 
related to musculoskeletal disorders (MSD) in Connecticut utilizing data from workers’ 
compensation reports and physicians’ reports. The first study estimated that in 1995 
underreported cases exceeded official reports by a ratio of 11:1, while the second study 
contradicts the BLS findings that assert a decline in MDS in Connecticut and the actual 
number was six times higher than what the BLS reported. Using National Health 
Interview Survey (NHIS) for the United States from 1997 to 1999, Smith et al. (2005) 
found that injuries that resulted in days away from work for private industries were 1.4 
times higher than what the BLS reported, and if government workers and self-employed 
are included the injuries were 1.8 times higher. Differently stated, the study showed that 
work-related injuries and illnesses are 40% and 80% higher, respectively, than what the 
BLS reports for private industry and when government employees are included. What is 
known about the BLS survey data is that they exclude certain work-related injuries and 
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illnesses for a group of employees (usually federal government employees, state and local 
government employees, railroad workers, nonagriculture self-employed), and given that 
the problem of underreporting according to the previous studies is already huge, the vast 
scope can only be imagined for underreporting cases when they are included. Leigh et al. 
(2004) examined underreporting in the case where all of the excluded employees are 
included and concluded that BLS-SOII missed between 33% and 69% of all work-related 
injuries and illnesses. Using Canadian survey data Shannon and Lowe (2002) estimated 
that 40% of eligible injured workers did not file for workers’ compensation claims.  
 The construction of Denver International Airport (DIA) provided a unique 
opportunity to study all aspects of workplace injuries and illnesses as they happened in 
real-time.  It provided a wealth of data and constituted an actual experiment that 
furnished an empirical measure with which to assess BLS reports in regard to 
occupational injuries and illnesses. Glazner et al. (1998) studied this project and 
compared data from two different sources (payroll, workers’ compensation) to the data 
published by the BLS. Their estimates of total work-related injuries and illnesses based 
on data from payroll and workers compensation was more than twice the rate of what 
BLS reports showed during the project years. 
 From the foregoing literature review it is apparent that underreporting is a major 
problem from which most of the current monitoring system suffers, while meanwhile, the 
severity of the problem as measured by the magnitude of underreporting is not declining 
over time. From the earliest study to the most recent one, the overall magnitude has 
remained almost the same and in some cases it is even increasing over time in certain 
industries and for a certain type of employees. Efforts to mitigate the problem must start 
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from an understanding of the driving forces behind it, where the causes for 
underreporting must be determined in the first place and the question of why 
occupational injuries and illnesses should be underreported be answered. 
 There are number of reasons behind injuries and illnesses being underreported to 
the national monitoring system like BLS, workers compensation, and SOII among others.  
Underreporting can be due to industrial factors (employee incentives) and also to 
individual factors (workers’ incentives). The interchangeable relation between employees 
and workers is a major cause of the underreporting problem from which current 
monitoring systems suffering. Fan, Bonauto, Foley, and Silverstein (2006) examined 
underreporting to workers’ compensation in 2002 for Washington state and found a 
strong correlation between certain individual- and industrial factors and underreporting.  
Their findings were not appreciably different from other studies with 52% of workers 
who suffered work-related injuries reported to workers’ compensation which is a little 
higher than findings of some other studies. 
 Examining the events or sequence of events that might lead to work-related 
injuries and illnesses being underreported is crucial to understanding the problem and 
also provides insights into how to remedy this problem or to mitigate it to some extent 
given that 100% reporting of injuries and illnesses would be almost next to impossible 
with existing reporting and oversight mechanisms.  
 Azaroff et al. (2002) criticized major national monitoring agencies including the 
BLS for the quality of the data describing them as “fragmentary, unreliable, inconsistent, 
and underestimate[ing] the incidence of injuries and illnesses” (p. 1421). With the help of 
a filtering system, which they adapted from Webb, Redman, Wilkinson, and Sanson-
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Fisher (1989), they showed that the process of documenting work related injuries and 
illnesses involves a complex series of events during which many of these injuries and 
illnesses and many cases will be lost in the documentation process.  The study shows that 
the process of documenting any work-related injuries and illnesses confronts partial 
barriers and obstacles before being reported to any of the national monitoring systems. 
Their argument is that within the documentation process there inhere some obstacles that 
will filter out and block the reporting of many cases, especially those for low wage 
workers and immigrants where they considered a significant portion of the labor force. A 
follow up work by the same authors (Azaroff et al., 2004) used the filtering system as an 
alternative interpretation to explain why work-related injuries and illnesses are declining, 
and claiming that the decline in injuries and illnesses was due to underreporting and not 
attributable to other factors that some researchers claim are behind the decline. The 
filtering model they adapted will explain the barriers facing documenting injuries and 
illnesses in BLS, workers’ compensation and medical data bases. 
 The filter model proposed by Azaroff shows the sequence of events for 
documenting work related injuries and illnesses to different systems. At the same time it 
shows the conceptual filters that partially block the reporting process. The authors also 
estimated how much many related injuries and illnesses are lost during the reporting 
process based on the previous literature.  In the study, each filter blocked or impeded the 
reporting at different degrees.  When a work related injury happens either the worker will 
report to the supervisor or will be submitted to medical care. According to this filtering 
model, between 24 and 94% of cases will be lost before even reported to the supervisor. 
If the injury is successfully reported to the supervisor it needs to be classified if the injury 
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is severe and requires days away from work. Around 90% of injuries will be lost and not 
classified to require days away from work. This filtering model as mentioned developed 
to explain the obstacles to reporting injuries and illnesses.   
 The reasons behind not being able to report injuries and illnesses by both 
employees and workers given in the previous studies included the perception of injuries 
as simply being ‘part of the job’; workers’ fear of being reprimanded or disciplined; 
being labeled as a ‘complainer’; being considered ‘careless’; consider an injury to be 
‘minor’; the difficulty in recognizing the relatedness of an injury to work;  company goals 
for not reporting as part of the incentives program of a company; harassment; loss of 
promotional opportunities; transfer to less desirable jobs or locations; deportation; job 
loss; and denial of overtime. While for his part, a manager’s incentives for not reporting 
can include poor evaluations; the loss of raises and bonuses (Azaroff et al., 2004, 2002).  
 However, according to Azaroff et al. (2004) the political, economical and legal 
reasons behind the difficulty of reporting started back in the 1980s and 1990s. These 
reasons are: 
 Growth in economic activity. 
 Exclusion of increasing numbers of immigrant workers from reporting systems. 
 Spread of incentive systems that reward low levels of reported injuries and 
illnesses. 
 Declining access to medical care. 
 Increasing obstacles to establishing work-relatedness of injuries. 
 Workers’ compensation reform. (Azaroff et al., 2004, p. 275) 
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 In this work, the focus will be on the factor of Hispanic immigrant workers and 
how their presence in the labor force will increase the chances of injuries and illnesses 
being unreported. 
The Hispanic Work Force 
 The United States population is growing and so its racial and ethnic composition 
is changing, with Hispanics as the nation’s largest ethnic minority group and the fastest 
growing one at the same time, with 46.9 million in 2008 compared to 35.3 million in 
2000 census accounting for about 15.4% of the total United States population and an 
astonishing growth of about 32% in less than a decade (Pew Hispanic Center, 2010).  The 
Hispanic population has almost tripled in the past 30 years and so their participation in 
the labor increased, especially in jobs with low skills and most likely dangerous like 
agriculture and construction among others. 
 There is not much literature or empirical research or, even for that matter, even 
sufficient data on Hispanics’ in general. This problem becomes even more acute when 
trying to obtain data about Hispanics’ injuries and illnesses and other more specific data 
about undocumented Hispanic workers, and if such research is found it will likely be both 
very recent and of a small sample size.  This is why we do not see a plethora of research 
related to Hispanics or other minority groups. 
 According to the BLS figures, the Hispanic labor force is mostly concentrated in 
agriculture followed by construction.  In terms of their relative percentages when 
compared to other minority groups, in 2009 Hispanic employment in construction 
reached about 2.3 million or about 23.5% of total construction employment the second 
after agriculture with 28.5% of total employment (BLS, 2010c). During the same year, 
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construction absorbed about 9.7 million workers out of a total labor force in the nation 
which represents about 7%; but this industry suffered a disproportionate number of death 
cases of 816 case out of 4340 cases, representing about 18.8%; also the Hispanic share 
was about 15% with 668 cases of death out of the total number of death cases in private 
industry in the nation (BLS, 2010b). Data for construction deaths among Hispanic 
workers in 2009 are not currently available, but Hispanic death cases in construction in 
2008 represent 4.7% out of total number of fatal injuries in the nation, and 24.6% in 
construction alone. A more detailed picture of how fatal occupational injuries are 
distributed across different ethnic groups can be ascertained from the following 
information. 
 Since 1992 when the Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries was established, the 
total number of fatal injuries is 105,497 cases, of which the total number of Hispanic 
fatalities is 13,712 which represents approximately 13% of the total. Another point is that 
the number of fatal work injuries involving Hispanics has risen each year since 1992 
from 533 cases to 990 fatal cases in 2006. 
 One important observation from Table 1 is that foreign-born Hispanic workers’ 
fatal occupation injuries are higher than US-born Hispanic workers for all years since 
1992, even though the total number of fatal work injuries for the same period declined by 
1877 cases or about 30.2%; the same is true for fatal injuries in construction where the 
same period witnessed a decline in the number of fatal injuries. Figure 7 shows that total 
number of fatal injury cases for the whole economy or for construction is declining, but 
Hispanic fatal injuries in construction increased from 104 cases in 1992 to 250 cases in 
2008, while fatal injury cases are declining for all other races. 
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1992 6217 919 533 275 51.59 258 104 
1993 6331 932 634 320 50.47 314 103 
1994 6632 1028 624 336 53.85 288 110 
1995 6275 1055 619 342 55.28 277 142 
1996 6202 1047 638 371 58.15 267 133 
1997 6238 1107 658 379 57.60 279 166 
1998 6055 1174 707 405 57.28 302 211 
1999 6054 1191 730 468 64.11 262 224 
2000 5920 1155 815 494 60.61 321 277 
2001 5915 1226 895 572 63.91 323 280 
2002 5534 1125 841 578 68.73 263 244 
2003 5575 1171 794 520 65.49 274 264 
2004 5764 1278 902 596 66.08 306 317 
2005 5734 1243 923 638 69.12 285 321 
2006 5840 1297 990 667 67.37 323 360 
2007 5657 1239 937 534 56.99 303 317 
2008 5214 1016 804 503 62.56 301 250 
2009 4340 816 668 393 58.83 275  
Total  105497 20019 13719 8391 61.16 5221 3823 
Source: (BLS, 2010b). 
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 As can be seen, Figure 8 the share of fatal occupational injuries in construction 
for foreign-born Hispanics has increased whereas it has remained steady among US-born. 
For example, foreign-born Hispanics’ fatal injuries as a percent of total Hispanic fatal 
injuries was about 59%, with the lowest in 1993 and the highest in 2005. This increase in 
fatal injuries for foreign-born workers over time happened at a time when the overall fatal 
occupational injuries cases were declining.  
 Although fatalities decreased during 2008 and 2009 because of the recession, 
fatalities in construction still represented about 20 and 19% of total reported nations 
work-related deaths, respectively. This number is relatively high given the fact that 
construction absorbed only about 8% of the work force during these years. The number 
of fatalities in construction reflects the fact that employment in construction fluctuates in 
relation to the nation’s economy, meaning more workers during economic boom and less 
during recessions. We can see this trend in fatal injuries in construction and how it 
fluctuates during the business cycle. For example, between 2007 and 2008 number of 
fatal injuries in construction declined by 18% while it increased by about 41% between 
1992 and 2006.   
 The trend for occupational injuries and illnesses with days away from work in 
construction for Hispanics compared with white non-Hispanics is another important 
indicator to consider when investigating underreporting. We see that number of 
occupational injuries and illnesses with days away from work is declining for all 
industries and for construction as well. Comparing Hispanics with White non-Hispanics 
reporting of injuries and illnesses with day away from work in construction we see that it 




Figure 8. US-born vs. foreign born Hispanic fatal injuries. 
 From Table 2 and Figure 9 we see that Hispanics’ injuries with days away from 
work increased between 1992 and 2008 from 17715 cases to 25360 cases or by about 
30%, while at the same time their representation increased. On the other side the statistics 
for Whites were completely the opposite. 
 These facts about foreign-born workers and immigrants in general suggest that 
they are more likely to take more dangerous and risky jobs than US-born, and therefore, 
it is to be expected that this will account for a higher proportion or higher representation 
of Hispanics in agriculture and construction. Even if the percentage of non-Hispanics at 
one point or another is higher in these sectors of the economy, nevertheless, it is found 
that immigrants and foreign-born workers will be occupying and performing the more 
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Table 2. Number of Nonfatal Occupational Injuries and Illnesses Involving Days Away 
from Work by Selected Worker and Case Characteristics and Industry, All US Private 
Industry 








of White non 
Hispanics 
1992 2331098 209564 17715 143555 8.45 68.50 
1993 2252591 204769 18017 141577 8.80 69.14 
1994 2236639 218835 17739 150093 8.11 68.59 
1995 2040929 190591 18995 125335 9.97 65.76 
1996 1880525 182334 19713 120727 10.81 66.21 
1997 1833380 189839 22501 123793 11.85 65.21 
1998 1730534 178341 22990 112896 12.89 63.30 
1999 1702470 193765 28757 121504 14.84 62.71 
2000 1664018 194410 26583 119081 13.67 61.25 
2001 1537567 185662 29749 110592 16.02 59.57 
2002 1436194 163641 26133 98674 15.97 60.30 
2003 1315920 155420 26750 88530 17.21 56.96 
2004 1259320 153200 27990 90020 18.27 58.76 
2005 1234680 157070 32770 90070 20.86 57.34 
2006 1183500 153180 33930 83100 22.15 54.25 
2007 1158870 135350 25480 75750 18.83 55.97 
2008 1078140 120240 25360 66810 21.09 55.56 
Source: (BLS, 2010b). 
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 Another salient point that appears in Table 1 and 3 is that even though numbers of 
fatal occupational injuries for most other groups of workers are declining, fatal 
occupational injuries for Hispanic workers appear to be increasing. There are many 
reasons behind this obvious trend of fatal occupational injuries among foreign-born 
Hispanic workers. Typically, foreign-born workers are disproportionally represented in 
occupations with higher risk of injuries as well as in lower-paying jobs, and these trends 
are due to the limited opportunities and job options for those workers due to factors—by 
no means exclusive—such as: lower educational levels; poor language skills; as well as 
the legal and economic structure of the hiring system (Loh & Richardson, 2004).  
 The dearth of research targeting Hispanics in general and their representation in 
the most dangerous job with focus on fatal and nonfatal occupational injuries gives an 
impression of ignorance for a very important and dynamic sector of the population. The 
need for more research on Hispanics is urgent given some of the facts elucidated above.  
As Brunette (2004) notes: 
To date, very little construction safety and health research has been conducted 
involving Hispanic workers. While there might be some ongoing research projects 
targeted to construction Hispanics worker’s safety, their dissemination process 
maybe quite poor. Lack of publication in peer reviewed journals and in other 
relevant sources of information gives the impression that minimal or no research 
activities targeted to the Hispanic construction workforce in the United States are 
being taken by the research community. (p. 244) 
 The research of Dong and Platner (2004) and Dong et al. (2010) targeting 
Hispanics’ fatal occupational injuries in construction is among the few studies focusing 
on Hispanic construction worker fatalities, with emphasis on demographics and cultural 
characteristics to explain the trend in workplace deaths. Both studies stressed the fact that 
Hispanic construction workers face higher risks of fatal and nonfatal injuries.  Even 
though the numbers are high relative to other ethnic groups, actual Hispanic 
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1992 6217 4711 618 169 36 150 
1993 6331 4665 649 190 46 147 
1994 6632 4954 695 179 39 141 
1995 6275 4599 684 161 27 185 
1996 6202 4586 615 170 35 158 
1997 6238 4576 661 195 34 114 
1998 6055 4478 583 148 28 111 
1999 6054 5019 627 192 57 146 
2000 5920 4244 575 185 33 68 
2001 5915 4175 565 182 48 50 
2002 5534 3926 491 140 40 96 
2003 5575 3988 543 158 42 50 
2004 5764 4066 546 180 28 42 
2005 5734 3977 584 163 50 35 
2006 5840 4019 565 159 46 61 
2007 5657 3867 609 172 29 43 
2008 5214 3663 533 152 32 30 
Source: (BLS, 2010b). 
fatalities might be even higher still given underestimation and undercounts as errors that 
typically arise in the process of capturing data about the informal sector workers where 
Hispanics tend to be concentrated. Additionally, rate research in regard to Hispanic 
construction workers is of the type focusing on nonfatal injuries simply because it is 
much simpler to avoid reporting nonfatal injuries than fatal ones. As mentioned above, 
studies have proven that data reported by BLS on nonfatal construction injuries are less 
than the actual number (Glazner et al., 1998), not to mention that a large portion of the 
labor force is intentionally excluded from the Survey of Occupational Injury and Illnesses 
(SOII). 
 Documenting nonfatal injuries among Hispanic construction workers so as to 
ascertain whether or not they are suffering a rate higher than that of their counterparts is 
not an easy task given the nature of the industry itself and overall lack of information 
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related to Hispanics. For nonfatal injuries among Hispanic construction workers Dong et 
al. (2010) concluded that:  
Hispanics were nearly 30% more likely to have medical conditions due to work 
related injuries than white, non-Hispanics, after controlling for occupation, 
gender, age, and education. Also, when measured in terms of lost workdays, 
injuries were more likely to be greater in severity for Hispanics compared with 
whites. (p. 567) 
The compiled evidence rules out any possible denial of the fact that Hispanics are prone 
to higher fatal and nonfatal injuries in construction (in less skilled industries) compared 
to other ethnic and racial groups (Anderson, Hunting, & Welch, 2000; Forst, Avila, 
Anozei, & Rubin, 2010; Pransky et al., 2002). 
 Very rarely has research been conducted to estimate or quantify the influence of 
the existence of Hispanic workers on underreporting in construction or in any other 
industry. This work will be the first attempt to examine the Hispanic factor on 
underreporting of injuries and illnesses in construction. 
  
CHAPTER IV 
DATA AND MODEL 
 To date, very little empirical research has examined the issue of under-reporting 
of workplace related injuries and illnesses in construction focusing on the Hispanics. The 
data used ranged from state level data to the level of individuals, and as mentioned 
before, all the previous studies investigated this issue by focusing on the manufacturing 
sector and, in many cases, only studying the under-reporting issues in general and 
without any focus on any specific factor. Herein lies my departure from the previous 
research, where construction industry and Hispanics will serve as the main units of 
investigation to examine under-reporting.  In this research, the data will be state-level 
data for the construction industry in general and six different occupations within 
construction covering electricians, carpenters, masons, roofers, residential construction 
workers, and plumbers. The structure of the data will be state panel- longitudinal- data 
over the period from 1976 to 2008. Injury rate (incident rate) data, where the incident rate 
represents numbers of injuries and illnesses per 100 equivalent full time workers and the 
data are collected for five types of injuries, which are total cases, total cases with lost 
work days, cases away from work, cases with no lost work, and finally light duty-job 
transfers or restrictions.   With the exceptions of Colorado, Idaho, Mississippi, New 
Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota, the data for each state 
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as well as the District of Columbia have been collected from publications of the United 
States Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, 
(1976-1995), and the remainder of the data from http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshstate.htm 
(1996-2008). The BLS website does not always include data from 1995. In the case of 
Wyoming, for example, the data from the BLS website was first reported beginning in 
2002, and it does not contain the Illinois data for injuries and illnesses prior to 1998.  
This means that the data for these states and others for which reporting did not begin in 
1995 were collected from the previous source (Survey of Occupational Injuries and 
Illnesses). One problem with the data recording of the BLS is that until 2001, incident 
rate of occupational injuries and illnesses tables were divided into two major incidents: 
injuries and illnesses. Since 2002, however, the same data have been combined into a 
single figure. While this difference is worth noting, it will not adversely impact the 
analysis because illnesses constitute such a small percentage of the overall rate. Illnesses 
rates had negligible impact, and may therefore be ignored at this point. That is, based on 
the available data from the BLS about nonfatal occupational injuries and illnesses, 
illnesses represent only about 2.5% of the overall nonfatal occupational injuries and 
illnesses in construction. From this point the total cases of injuries and illnesses are 
divided into categories where the incident in question caused any loss of work days or 
not, and based on this information we can calculate (if such information is not given) job 
transfer or job restriction, which is coded as light duty in this research and is considered 
as indicative of one of the main injury types that sheds some light on the issue of under-
reporting with the presence of Hispanics in the work force. The under-reporting 
problem—when Hispanics are present in the industry—is concealed in this last variable 
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for the category of reassignment to “light duty.” A reassignment to “light duty” implies 
that an injury has occurred.  The data show that reassignments to light duty are 
increasing, even while other types of injuries are declining.  For example, injuries and 
illnesses with days away from work are declining, as are total recoded injuries and 
illnesses.  
 Table 4 shows all types of nonfatal injuries and illnesses for private construction 
industry workers for the United States since 1976. It is immediately apparent that total 
recorded injuries and illnesses are declining over time, from 15.3 cases per 100 full time 
equivalent workers (FTEW) in 1976, to 4.7 cases per 100 full time equivalent workers 
(FTEW) in 2008, or a decline of about 70%. On the other hand, injuries that resulted in 
job transfer or restrictions (light duty) increased for construction from 0.1 cases per 100 
full time equivalent workers (FTEW) in 1976, to 0.8 cases per 100 full time equivalent 
workers (FTEW) in 2008. This is an overall increase of 700%. The same phenomenon 
can be observed in almost all industries with an increasing trend of incident rate of 
injuries with restricted work activities (light duty). 
 Injuries that required job transfer of restrictions (light duty) peaked to 1 case per 
100 full time equivalent workers (FTEW) for 6 years from 2001 to 2006, and then 
declined to 0.8 case per 100 full time equivalent workers (FTEW) in 2008. It seems that 
these changes are likely due to a better recording and coding mechanism, and workers 
who are more aware of their rights when it comes to injuries.   
Graphically this construction industry behavior in regard to be workplace injuries 




Table 4. Nonfatal Injuries and Illnesses for Private Construction 
Industry Workers for the Entire United States Since 1976 










without    
lost 
workdays Light duty 
1976 15.3 5.5 5.4 9.8 0.1 
1977 15.5 5.9 5.8 9.6 0.1 
1978 16 6.4 6.3 9.6 0.1 
1979 16.2 6.8 6.6 9.4 0.2 
1980 15.7 6.5 6.3 9.2 0.2 
1981 15.1 6.3 6.1 8.8 0.2 
1982 14.6 6 5.8 8.6 0.2 
1983 14.8 6.3 6.1 8.5 0.2 
1984 15.5 6.9 6.6 8.6 0.3 
1985 15.2 6.8 6.5 8.4 0.3 
1986 15.2 6.9 6.6 8.3 0.3 
1987 14.7 6.8 6.4 7.9 0.4 
1988 14.6 6.8 6.5 7.8 0.3 
1989 14.3 6.8 6.3 7.5 0.5 
1990 14.2 6.7 6.2 7.5 0.5 
1991 13 6.1 5.6 6.9 0.5 
1992 13.1 5.8 5.3 7.3 0.5 
1993 12.2 5.5 4.9 6.7 0.6 
1994 11.8 5.5 4.9 6.3 0.6 
1995 10.6 4.9 4.2 5.8 0.7 
1996 9.9 4.5 3.7 5.4 0.8 
1997 9.5 4.4 3.6 5 0.8 
1998 8.8 4 3.3 4.8 0.7 
1999 8.6 4.2 3.3 4.4 0.9 
2000 8.3 4.1 3.2 4.2 0.9 
2001 7.9 4 3 3.9 1 
2002 7.1 3.8 2.8 3.2 1 
2003 6.8 3.6 2.6 3.2 1 
2004 6.4 3.4 2.4 3 1 
2005 6.3 3.4 2.4 2.9 1 
2006 5.9 3.2 2.2 2.7 1 
2007 5.4 2.8 1.9 2.6 0.9 








Figure 10. Construction injuries and illnesses trend. 
The data reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) are considered 
incomplete and at some point questionable, because the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
usually collects its data by conducting a survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses 
(SOII) and typically only private industries are included; the self-employed are not 
required to report any injuries and illnesses. 
 BLS data may not always be complete because of the many exceptions to its 
reporting requirements. The BLS survey data excludes the self-employed, farms with 
fewer than 11 employees, private households, federal government agencies, state and 
local government agencies. This casts doubt on the quality of the data in general, and 
particularly for the construction industry. Statistics show that about one-fourth of 
construction workers are self-employed, and therefore, this leads to a substantial gap in 
the information about health and safety for those workers. A related problem is the 
method of data collection. Usually, BLS survey data are based on OSHA logs that 
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the quality of the data reported often depends on the employer. The employer may be 
limited in his knowledge of what to report, and the logs are also subject to his judgment 
of which incidents are work-related and which are not.  The honesty of the employer 
further complicates matters. Because of these factors, the data reported by the BLS are 
likely skewed by under-reporting. This problem becomes even more pronounced in 
construction because of the nature of the industry, where small establishments 
predominate, and the demographics of the employees resist accurate reporting. Another 
methodological problem with BLS data on injury rates pertains to coding. 
A new system of coding industries and occupations has been used since 2003. In 
2003, BLS changed its coding system of industries and occupation and officially adopted 
the North America Industry Classification System (NAICS) coding system. Previous to 
this, the agency had used the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) coding system. The 
main goal of the NAICS is to facilitate accurate comparisons between the United States, 
Canada, and Mexico. The NACIS system uses a production-oriented coding schema 
employing six digits, which allows for more flexibility than the two-digit coding system 
under SIC. The new system groups industries according to the production process used, 
rather than the system utilized by SIC. Table 5 gives a sample of this coding system. The 
transition from the SIC coding system of 1987 to the NAICS coding system of 2002 for 
construction is outlined in Table 6. The major problem that faces the researcher with this 
transition to the new system is the comparability of the data between the two periods and 




Table 5. NACIS Coding System 
Code Digit Sector Example 
23 First two Major Sector Construction 
236 Third Subsector Construction of Buildings 
2361 Fourth Industry Group Residential Building Construction 
23611 Fifth NACIS International Industry Residential Building Construction 
236117 Sixth National Industry (US) New Housing Operative Builders 
236118 Sixth National Industry (US) Residential Remodelers 
Source: (The Center for Construction Research and Training, 2007). 
Table 6. 1987 SIC Coding vs. 2002 NAICS Coding 
1987 US  SIC Description 1987 
SIC  
2002 NAICS US Description 2002 
NAICS  
  Construction  23 
General Building Contractors 15 Construction of buildings 236 
Residential Building Construction 152 Residential building construction 2361 
Plumbing, Heating, Air-
conditioning 
1711 Plumbing, heating, and air-
conditioning 
23822 
Painting and paper hanging                                                 1721 Painting and wall covering contractors                                            23832 
Electrical work 1731 Electrical contractors 23821 
Masonry, stonework, and plastering 1741 Masonry contractors 23814 
Carpentry and floor work 1751 Finished carpentry contractors 23835 
Roofing, siding, and sheet metal 
work 
1761 Roofing contractors   23816 
Source: (The Center for Construction Research and Training, 2007). 
 The workers’ compensation rate was collected and hand-coded from the 
Engineering News Record (2008) “Third Quarterly Cost Report,” where data are 
available for the period of study. The values for workers’ compensations are per $100 
payroll by state, occupation, and year. I matched their classification of work with 1987 
SIC and 2002 NAICS because each category is not specified or correlated with any of the 
national coding systems mentioned above. Because there is no classification for 
residential building construction that corresponds to that of the two systems—SIC 152 
and NAICS 2361, respectively, I used carpentry—1, 2 family residence as a proxy for the 
64 
 
above mentioned codes, and I also used general carpentry as a proxy for carpentry that 
would theoretically correspond to SIC 175 and NAICS 23835, respectively. 
 Another caveat when examining the workers’ compensation data is that data for 
some states are missing. There are three different ways an industry or an employer can 
obtain worker compensation insurance: first, through a private carrier; second, by being 
self-insured; and finally, through the state. Over time there have been changes in state 
regulations regarding who is eligible to provide workers’ compensation insurance.  As of 
2008, 47 jurisdictions out of 51 allow private carriers to write insurance policies; 26 
jurisdictions had monopolistic state funds that pay workers’ compensation benefits; and, 
finally, all jurisdictions except Wyoming and North Dakota allow employers to be self-
insured (Sengupta, Reno, & Burton, 2010). Given the fact that different states have 
different insurance arrangements, this data set is missing information about workers’ 
compensation rates for states with monopolistic state funds from 1983 to 2008, and these 
are: North Dakota, Ohio, Washington state, Wyoming (where data are also missing for 
the years from 1978 to 1981), West Virginia, and Nevada (which changed from state-
funded insurance to competitive private insurance in mid-1999). Workers’ compensation 
rates per $100 payroll are nominal values given for each year; to facilitate comparisons 
between years, those values were adjusted for inflation and the real values calculated for 
2008 prices. 
 Data about average weekly wage (also adjusted for inflation), number of 
establishments and annual average employment for state and private industry were 
collected and hand-coded from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’s annual bulletin 
Employment and Wages Annual Averages for every state and all years except 1980. One 
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challenge with regard to these data is that the industry classification system changed from 
SIC to NAICS in 2001, so caution must be exercised when comparing the data of these 
two periods. A related, albeit minor problem, is that from 1976 to 1981 data about 
average weekly wages and number of establishments are only available for major 
industry groups: SIC-15 general trade contractor, and SIC-17 special trade contractors. 
Data for the subgroups including electricians, carpenters, masons, roofers, residential 
construction workers, plumbers, and painters are not available. It should also be 
mentioned that the BLS definition of an “establishment” as an economic unit that 
produces goods or provides service and which is usually located at a single physical 
location and engages in a single economic activity, might be problematic for construction 
because of the nomadic nature of this industry.  
 State labor union percentage rates, where the data are for percentages of union 
members, are available from a website (www.unionstates.com) that is managed by Barry 
T. Hirsch and David A. Macpherson. These data are for each state and year from 1976 to 
2008. The values represent percentages for each state for nonagricultural wage and salary 
employees who are union members. State unemployment rates (not seasonally adjusted) 
for each year were collected from the Bureau of Labor Statistics web site 
http://www.bls.gov/lau/home.htm. 
 Demographic data for construction and the unemployment rate in construction 
have been collected by state, year, and occupation from the Current Population Survey-
Outgoing Rotation Groups (CPS-ORG), which is part of the Center for Economic and 
Policy Research http://www.ceprdata.org. The demographic variables of interest are 
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percentage Hispanic workers by state and year, construction unemployment rate by state 
and year; average construction worker age by state and year.   
Model 
 The nature of the data in this work (state, year, panel) requires the usage of a 
lagged Fixed Effect Model to investigate the problem of under-reporting of Hispanics’ 
injuries and illnesses in construction. The model will be lagged 3 years in one of the main 
independent variables that is the real workers’ compensation rate. At the same time the 
dependent variable (different types of injury rates) is used in the natural logarithm form. 
The Hausman test will be used to assess the consistency with the Random Effect Model. 
Grouping over states will also be used to correct for errors and robust models. The 
model-dependent variable is the different types of injuries, while the independent 
variables are the demographic variable (age), and labor market variables including real 
average weekly wage, unemployment rate, state union rate, employees per establishment 
(firm size), real workers’ compensation rate, percentage of Hispanic employees and their 
interactions. 
 Panel data (repeated measurement at different points in time on the same 
individual unit such as firm, state, country) models can capture variation over time and 
over unit, and there are many different models to accomplish this goal. There will be five 
different models for each injury type (total injuries, injuries with days away from work, 
injuries with lost workdays, injuries with no lost workdays, and light duty) as dependent 
variables, and each will be regressed against the above mentioned independent variables 




 A nested set of three fixed effects regressions were tested against each of five 
dependent variables measuring five types of injury rates per 100 employees: total annual 
injuries, injuries resulting in days away from work, injuries resulting in lost workdays 
(which include both days away from work and light duty work), injuries not resulting in 
lost workdays, and injuries resulting in light duty work assignments. Table 7 providing 
descriptive statistics for the variables in each model shows that the mean annual total 
injury rate was 10.45 injuries per 100 employees.  Almost half these injuries resulted in 
lost workdays (4.99) while somewhat more than half did not (5.56).  Because sample 
sizes vary across models, these two components of total injuries do not sum precisely to 
the total injury rate.  Lost workday injuries divided into injuries resulting in days away 
from work (4.44 per 100 employees) and injuries resulting in light duty work (0.59 per 
100 employees).  Lost day injury rates do not measure the days lost from an injury.  A 
lost workdays injury can entail from one lost workday to very many days away from 
work.  Injury rates vary widely in our data from a less than one injury per 100 workers to 
a high of 35 total injuries in a year per 100 full-time equivalent workers. 
 While injury rates for particular states and years are for specific subsectors within 
construction such as roofing contractors, the percent Hispanic is for overall construction 
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Table 7. Descriptive Statistics 
  Model     
  (3) (6) (9) (12) (15) 










Injury Rate per 100 
Employees 
mean 10.45 4.44 4.99 5.56 0.59 
 standard 
deviation 
5.04 2.58 2.57 3.09 0.58 
 minimum 0.50 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.00 
 maximum 35.20 19.80 21.00 43.00 7.60 
Real Worker Compensation 
Rate per $100 of Payroll 
mean 17.70 17.72 17.69 17.63 17.90 
 standard 
deviation 
13.10 13.12 13.10 13.09 13.32 
 minimum 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
 maximum 123.03 123.03 123.03 123.03 123.03 
Year mean 1995.93 1995.83 1995.93 1995.75 1995.09 
 standard 
deviation 
7.51 7.48 7.51 7.48 7.24 
 minimum 1982.00 1982.00 1982.00 1982.00 1982.00 
 maximum 2008.00 2008.00 2008.00 2008.00 2008.00 
Unionization Rate mean 13.41 13.45 13.41 13.42 13.38 
 standard 
deviation 
6.42 6.41 6.42 6.42 6.37 
 minimum 2.30 2.30 2.30 2.30 2.30 
 maximum 32.10 32.10 32.10 32.10 32.10 
Construction 
Unemployment Rate 
mean 7.99 8.01 7.98 8.01 8.06 
 standard 
deviation 
3.77 3.78 3.77 3.79 3.85 
 minimum 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.23 
 maximum 23.61 23.61 23.61 23.61 23.61 
Real Average Weekly Wage mean 763.05 762.46 763.17 763.27 757.67 
 standard 
deviation 
197.60 197.85 197.68 198.28 197.71 
 minimum 44.26 44.26 44.26 44.26 44.26 
 maximum 2034.78 2034.78 2034.78 2034.78 2034.78 
Employees per 
Establishment 
mean 8.91 8.94 8.91 8.94 8.86 
 standard 
deviation 
14.78 14.86 14.79 14.91 13.87 
 minimum 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 maximum 236.90 236.90 236.90 236.90 236.90 
Average Construction 
Worker Age 
mean 38.78 38.77 38.78 38.76 38.64 
 standard 
deviation 
1.65 1.64 1.65 1.65 1.60 
 minimum 33.73 33.73 33.73 33.73 33.73 




Table 7. continued 
 
  Model     
  (3) (6) (9) (12) (15) 










Percent Hispanic mean 17.98 17.87 18.01 17.78 17.34 
 standard 
deviation 
19.17 19.12 19.21 19.14 19.20 
 minimum 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
 maximum 83.70 83.70 83.70 83.70 83.70 
(Percent Hispanic)*(Real 
Worker Compensation Rate) 
mean 347.74 346.93 348.07 343.86 345.09 
 standard 
deviation 
552.13 553.91 552.34 553.92 566.58 
 minimum 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 




mean 207.41 206.98 207.59 204.85 196.57 
 standard 
deviation 
236.63 236.37 236.68 235.54 228.02 
 minimum 4.14 4.14 4.14 4.14 4.14 
 maximum 1319.30 1319.30 1319.30 1319.30 1319.30 
Observations  3,373 3,336 3,372 3,299 3,097 
Groups (State-Construction 
Subsector) 













within a given state and year.  The mean percent-Hispanic is around 18% with a standard 
deviation of about 19 percentage points.  Percent-Hispanic ranges from just 0.5% to over 
80%.  Construction unionization rates are also for state and year and in our sample 
average just under 13.5% and ranges from about 2% to over 30%.  Real worker 
compensation rates average about $17.70 per $100 of payroll.  This rate ranges widely 
from just $2.00 to $123 per $100 of payroll reflecting considerable differences in the 
dangers of different construction activities.  Thus, injury rates in construction fluctuate 
widely, and not surprisingly, so too do worker compensation rates which are based on 
past reported injuries. 
Base Model 
 In Table 8, the first model reported for each type of injury omits measures of 
Hispanic workers and predicts various injury rate types based on corresponding worker 
compensation rates which is lagged 4 years, a year trend plus economic and demographic 
variables (unionization rate, unemployment rate, real average weekly wage, employees 
per establishment, and average age).  With the exception of light duty injuries, this 
control model accounts for roughly half of all variation in injuries.  Setting aside the light 
duty model, in these base models, not surprisingly, workers’ compensation rates which 
are based on past reported injury experience negatively predict current injury rates.  The 
year trend in the models is negative reflecting long term trends in strengthened OSHA 
oversight of construction and enhanced safety practices in construction.  Unionization 
rates negatively predict injuries, reflecting the greater presence of formal training, 
including safety training, among unionized construction workers.  Controlling for 
unionization, in these base models, real average weekly wages also negatively predict  
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Table 8. Fixed Effect Regression: Base Model 




0.00315** 0.00538*** 0.00421*** 0.00278 0.000319 
 (0.00133) (0.00166) (0.00152) (0.00178) (0.00344) 
Real Workers’ 
Compensation 
Rate Lagged 1 
year 
0.00155 0.000757 -0.000264 0.00318 -0.00751* 
 (0.00164) (0.00205) (0.00189) (0.00221) (0.00426) 
Real Workers’ 
Compensation 
Rate Lagged 2 
Years 
2.95e-05 0.000104 0.00157 -0.00111 0.00783* 
 (0.00169) (0.00212) (0.00195) (0.00230) (0.00440) 
Real Workers’ 
Compensation 
Rate Lagged 3 
Years 
-0.000217 -0.00145 -0.00204 0.000197 0.000861 
 (0.00166) (0.00207) (0.00191) (0.00225) (0.00435) 
Real Workers’ 
Compensation 
Rate Lagged 4 
Years 
-0.00240* -0.00392** -0.00278* -0.00127 0.00261 
 (0.00129) (0.00161) (0.00148) (0.00176) (0.00340) 
Year -0.0482*** -0.0567*** -0.0436*** -0.0544*** 0.0468*** 
 (0.00156) (0.00195) (0.00179) (0.00210) (0.00424) 
Unionization Rate -0.0233*** -0.0263*** -0.0227*** -0.0248*** -0.0227** 




-0.00893*** -0.00882*** -0.00944*** -0.00966*** -0.00571 
 (0.00169) (0.00211) (0.00194) (0.00227) (0.00446) 
Real Average 
Weekly Wage 
-0.000643*** -0.000807*** -0.000617*** -0.000794*** -0.000303 
 (7.50e-05) (9.41e-05) (8.62e-05) (0.000101) (0.000210) 
Employees Per 
Establishment 
-0.000728* -0.000566 0.000128 -0.00156*** -0.00136 




-0.0219*** -0.00942* -0.0122** -0.0299*** -0.0120 
 (0.00447) (0.00558) (0.00513) (0.00601) (0.0119) 
Constant 100.1*** 115.8*** 89.72*** 112.2*** -93.28*** 
 (3.046) (3.817) (3.496) (4.107) (8.277) 
Observations 3,687 3,649 3,685 3,616 3,118 
R-squared 0.597 0.557 0.461 0.527 0.229 
Number of 
id_sic3_fip_sq 
231 231 231 227 220 
Standard errors in parentheses 




injuries, suggesting that more skilled construction workers generally are safer.  We 
expected larger contractors to be associated with fewer injuries due to economies of scale 
in introducing safety procedures, but our expectations were met with a statistically 
significant negative coefficient only in the case of no lost workday injuries.  Otherwise, 
our findings for firm size are statistically insignificant with mixed signs (actually my 
model shows that injuries with lost work days are statistically insignificant and positively 
related to firm size).  It is generally found that younger workers are at greater risk of 
injuries in construction, and I also consistently find this across all models. 
 In the case of light duty injuries where the injured worker is assigned less 
demanding tasks, our base model predicts only about 23% of the variation in light duty 
injury rates.  In contrast to other injury types, the year trend variable for the light duty 
injury rate is positive, indicating that the use of light duty assignments has risen over 
time.  (Light duty assignments reduce worker compensation costs by eliminating the need 
for replacement income payments in lost workday injury cases.  They may or may not 
reflect reduced medical costs.)  Furthermore, the workers’ compensation rate (lagged 4 
years) which powerfully negatively predicts other injury types is statistically insignificant 
with an opposite sign in the case of light duty work.  This opposite sign may be 
reasonable if higher workers’ compensation rates indicate more serious injuries reducing 
the option of shifting lost workday injuries from days away from work to light duty work. 
I generally conclude that, with the exception of light duty, my base models reasonably 




 In the second model (Table 9) nested within each injury type set of regressions, I 
introduce the percent Hispanic among construction workers in the state-year to estimate 
the effect of the presence of Hispanic workers on the reporting of injuries.  In all cases, 
the estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level.  In all of these 
regressions except light duty, the estimated coefficient for percent Hispanic is negative 
and statistically significant.  For light duty injury rates, the estimated coefficient is 
positive and statistically significant at less than 10% level.  This means that controlling 
for the aforementioned factors, a higher proportion of Hispanic workers leads to fewer 
reported injuries along with an increase in the use of light duty assignments for those 
workers reported injured.  The most likely explanation for this last result is that in the 
presence of more Hispanic workers on the job, injured workers are increasingly assigned 
to or are willing to accept light duty assignments rather than taking time off work. 
Based on the second model in each nested set, Table 10 calculates for a one standard 
deviation change in the percent Hispanic employed what these models predict will be 1) 
the percentage point change and 2) the percentage change in each type of injury rate 
evaluated at the mean injury rate.  While the predicted percentage point changes vary 
because the mean injury levels differ, for all injury types except light duty, the models 
predict between 3 to 8% decline in the rate of reported injuries associated with about a 19 
percentage point (one standard deviation) increase in the percent Hispanic.  In the case of 
light duty injury rates, in contrast, a roughly 19 percentage point increase in the percent 
Hispanic results in a predicted 3.7% increase in the reported injury rate for those assigned 
light duty work. 
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Table 9. Fixed Effect Regression: Base Model and Percent Hispanic 
VARIABLES lntotcase lnawayc lnlostwork lnnolost lnliteduty 
Real Workers’ 
Compensation Rate 
0.00248* 0.00453*** 0.00356** 0.00199 0.000445 
 (0.00136) (0.00172) (0.00158) (0.00185) (0.00352) 
Real Workers’ 
Compensation Rate 
Lagged 1 year 
0.00182 0.000782 -0.000161 0.00352 -0.00675 
 (0.00168) (0.00212) (0.00195) (0.00229) (0.00435) 
Real Workers’ 
Compensation Rate 
Lagged 2 Years 
-8.36e-05 6.14e-05 0.00163 -0.00130 0.00901** 
 (0.00175) (0.00221) (0.00204) (0.00240) (0.00456) 
Real Workers’ 
Compensation Rate 
Lagged 3 Years 
0.000368 -0.000395 -0.00138 0.000734 -0.00102 
 (0.00173) (0.00217) (0.00200) (0.00235) (0.00451) 
Real Workers’ 
Compensation Rate 
Lagged 4 Years 
-0.00258* -0.00422** -0.00289* -0.00162 0.00304 
 (0.00133) (0.00168) (0.00154) (0.00183) (0.00350) 
Year -0.0443*** -0.0541*** -0.0422*** -0.0459*** 0.0496*** 
 (0.00201) (0.00254) (0.00233) (0.00273) (0.00555) 
Unionization Rate -0.0221*** -0.0274*** -0.0230*** -0.0214*** -0.0190* 




-0.00730*** -0.00663*** -0.00798*** -0.00671*** -0.00525 
 (0.00188) (0.00236) (0.00218) (0.00254) (0.00496) 
Real Average 
Weekly Wage 
-0.000459*** -0.000652*** -0.000474*** -0.000545*** -0.000160 
 (8.29e-05) (0.000105) (9.60e-05) (0.000112) (0.000229) 
Employees Per 
Establishment 
-0.000409 -0.000270 0.000285 -0.000965* -0.00121 




-0.0222*** -0.00596 -0.00829 -0.0358*** -0.0160 
 (0.00491) (0.00618) (0.00569) (0.00666) (0.0130) 
Percent Hispanic -0.00434*** -0.00392*** -0.00271*** -0.00767*** -0.00178 
 (0.000858) (0.00108) (0.000993) (0.00116) (0.00236) 
Constant 92.15*** 110.5*** 86.74*** 95.30*** -98.82*** 
 (3.951) (4.991) (4.575) (5.363) (10.90) 
Observations 3,300 3,263 3,298 3,230 2,785 
R-squared 0.598 0.554 0.458 0.528 0.220 
Number of 
id_sic3_fip_sq 
230 230 230 226 219 
Standard errors in parentheses 

















Estimated coefficient for percent 
Hispanics 
-0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.008 -0.002 
Standard Deviation of coefficient 17.542 17.506 17.531 17.350 17.477 
Predicted change in rate with one 
Standard Deviation change in 
percent Hispanic 
-0.070 -0.070 -0.053 -0.139 -0.035 
Mean rate 2.341 1.436 1.563 1.686 -0.906 
Mean rate minus predicted change 2.271 1.366 1.483 1.547 -0.941 
Percent change in mean rate for 1 
Standard Deviation change in 
percent Hispanic 













Union and Workers’ Compensation Interactions with Hispanic 
Effect 
 The full model (Table 11) in each nested set introduces two interaction terms 
examining the effect of the percent Hispanic in the presence of higher unionization rates 
and the percent Hispanic in the presence of higher workers’ compensation rates.  Unions 
may make construction sites safer but they also may induce a higher reporting of the 
injuries that do occur.  Again setting aside the light duty model, in every other full model, 
the interaction term between percent Hispanic and unionization yields a positive 
coefficient which in the case of days away from work injuries is statistically significant at 
the 1% level.  In the case of light duty injuries, the coefficient is negative and statistically 
insignificant.  These results suggest that in the presence of unionized Hispanic workers, 
injuries are more likely to be reported, particularly serious injuries, and these injuries are 
less likely to result in light duty assignments.  Furthermore, again setting aside the light 
duty case, once a Hispanic reporting effect is included in the full model, the direct union 
effect becomes increasingly negative compared to the previous model suggesting that the 
estimated union effect in the first two models of each set is indeed a composite of 
increased safety and an offset of increased reporting. 
 Workers’ compensation rates are set based upon past experience with reported 
injuries.  Contractors are motivated to not report injuries when these injuries are more 
costly to the contractor.  Thus, it may be that the under-reporting of injuries associated 
with the presence of Hispanic workers is more common where workers’ compensation 
rates are higher.  Introducing an interaction between percent Hispanic and workers’ 
compensation rates yields negative and statistically insignificant estimated coefficients 
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Table 11. Fixed Effect Regression: Full Model 
VARIABLES lntotcase lnawayc lnlostwork lnnolost lnliteduty 
Real Workers’ 
Compensation Rate 
0.00253* 0.00433** 0.00374** 0.00187 -0.00637* 
 (0.00148) (0.00186) (0.00171) (0.00201) (0.00385) 
Real Workers’ 
Compensation Rate 
Lagged 1 Year 
0.00181 0.000603 -0.000193 0.00351 -0.00687 
 (0.00169) (0.00212) (0.00195) (0.00229) (0.00433) 
Real Workers’ 
Compensation Rate 
Lagged 2 Years 
-5.29e-05 0.000270 0.00171 -0.00130 0.00785* 
 (0.00176) (0.00221) (0.00204) (0.00241) (0.00456) 
Real Workers’ 
Compensation Rate 
Lagged 3 Years 
0.000379 -0.000426 -0.00135 0.000714 -0.00177 
 (0.00173) (0.00217) (0.00200) (0.00236) (0.00450) 
Real Workers’ 
Compensation Rate 
Lagged 4 Years 
-0.00257* -0.00411** -0.00287* -0.00162 0.00278 
 (0.00133) (0.00168) (0.00154) (0.00183) (0.00349) 
Year -0.0443*** -0.0546*** -0.0424*** -0.0458*** 0.0529*** 
 (0.00204) (0.00256) (0.00236) (0.00276) (0.00563) 
Unionization Rate -0.0222*** -0.0284*** -0.0235*** -0.0213*** -0.0130 
 (0.00430) (0.00542) (0.00498) (0.00582) (0.0116) 
Construction 
Unemployment Rate 
-0.00729*** -0.00651*** -0.00795*** -0.00671*** -0.00514 
 (0.00188) (0.00236) (0.00218) (0.00254) (0.00494) 
Real Average Weekly 
Wage 
-0.000457*** -0.000633*** -0.000471*** -0.000544*** -0.000147 
 (8.31e-05) (0.000105) (9.62e-05) (0.000113) (0.000228) 
Employees Per 
Establishment 
-0.000420 -0.000344 0.000257 -0.000961* -0.000844 
 (0.000388) (0.000485) (0.000449) (0.000521) (0.00103) 
Average Construction 
Worker Age 
-0.0222*** -0.00603 -0.00823 -0.0358*** -0.0191 
 (0.00492) (0.00618) (0.00569) (0.00666) (0.0130) 
Percent Hispanic -0.00453*** -0.00669*** -0.00314** -0.00781*** -0.00723** 
Real Workers’ 
Compensation Rate 




-2.91e-06 1.32e-05 -9.68e-06 6.47e-06 0.000346*** 




3.10e-05 0.000324*** 7.62e-05 3.94e-06 -7.93e-05 
 (9.18e-05) (0.000116) (0.000106) (0.000126) (0.000261) 
Constant 92.30*** 111.4*** 87.14*** 95.22*** -105.3*** 
 (3.995) (5.036) (4.626) (5.419) (11.04) 
Observations 3,300 3,263 3,298 3,230 2,785 




Table 11. continued 
 
VARIABLES lntotcase lnawayc lnlostwork lnnolost lnliteduty 
Number of 
id_sic3_fip_sq 
230 230 230 226 219 
Standard errors in parentheses 





















for all injury types except light duty where the coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  This suggests that where reporting injuries is more expensive, 
in the presence of Hispanic workers fewer injuries are reported and injuries are shifted 
probably from days away from work to light duty assignments.  With the introduction of 
this interaction between percent Hispanic and workers’ compensation rates capturing 
under-reporting and classification shifting, the direct relationship between workers’ 
compensation rates and reported injuries becomes more strongly positive in all but the 
light duty case, suggesting that workers’ compensation rates developed prior to time t are 
more strongly correlated with reported injuries in time t when under-reporting associated 
with the presence of Hispanic workers in time t is controlled for. 
 Table 12 provides predictions of injury rates from the five full models based on 
mean values for each independent variable (except year, which is set at 2008), and 
selected one standard deviation changes in variables of interest to an analysis of under-
reporting.  Column 1 in Table 12 shows a base model of averages (mean) for the 
independent variable with the corresponding predicted value for each injury type.  (The 
interaction terms are calculated from the assumed values for each term in the interaction).  
In column 2, the unionization rate has been raised one standard deviation from 13.41 to 
19.83.  The interaction between the unionization rate and percent Hispanic, which creates 
a reporting effect in this prediction, has been restricted to the value in the base model.   
This allows for an isolation of the union safety effect, without the imposition of a 
union reporting effect.  All predicted injury rates fall (e.g., total injury from 5.20 to 4.00) 
except light duty which rises from 0.96 to 0.97.  Thus, higher unionization leads to fewer 
injuries with a small shift to light duty injuries.   
80 
 
Table 12. Predicting Injury Rates with Full Model 
 Assumed Values for Predictions     
 Base Increase Union Rate Increase Hispanic 
Percent 
Increase WC Rate 























Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Worker Comp Rate 17.70 17.70 17.70 17.70 17.70 30.80 30.80 
Year 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 
Unionization Rate 13.41 19.83 19.83 13.41 13.41 13.41 13.41 
Unemployment Rate 7.99 7.99 7.99 7.99 7.99 7.99 7.99 
Avg. Weekly Wage 763.05 763.05 763.05 763.05 763.05 763.05 763.05 
Employees per 
Establishment 
8.91 8.91 8.91 8.91 8.91 8.91 8.91 
Average Age 38.78 38.78 38.78 38.78 38.78 38.78 38.78 
Percent Hispanic 17.98 17.98 17.98 37.15 37.15 17.98 17.98 
WC*Percent Hispanic 318.28 318.28 318.28 657.65 657.65 318.28 553.85 
Unionization 
Rate*Percent Hispanic 
241.18 241.18 356.53 241.18 498.35 241.18 241.18 
Dependent Variables: Predicted Injury Rate      
Total 5.20 4.00 4.18 4.41 4.82 6.15 5.84 
Away 1.76 0.93 1.06 1.32 1.59 2.41 2.15 
Lost 2.66 1.90 1.96 2.32 2.47 3.23 3.03 
No Lost 2.62 2.16 2.26 2.18 2.41 2.97 2.86 
Light duty 0.96 0.97 0.91 1.07 0.96 0.83 0.91 
Dependent Variables: Percent Chg. in Prediction when Union-Hispanic or WC-Hispanic Interaction 
Allowed 
Total   4.5%  9.3%  -5.0% 
Away   14.0%  20.5%  -10.8% 
Lost   3.2%  6.5%  -6.2% 
No Lost   4.6%  10.6%  -3.7% 
Light duty   -6.2%  -10.3%  9.6% 
 
However, in column 3 when the countervailing union reporting effect is permitted 
(by allowing the union-Hispanic interaction term to rise due to an increase in 
unionization), most injury rates rise somewhat (e.g., total injuries having fallen from 5.20 
to 4.00 rise to 4.18) while the predicted light duty injury rate falls to 0.91.  The bottom 
segment in Table 12 shows the rebound in reported injury rates associated with the union-
Hispanic reporting effect (e.g., predicted reported total injury rates rebound by 4.5% 
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when the union-Hispanic reporting effect is permitted).   In the case of the most serious 
type of injuries (days away from work), a one standard deviation increase in unionization 
(6.5 percentage points) leads to a predicted drop in serious injuries from 1.76 per 100 
employees to 0.93 (the safety effect) but when the union-Hispanic reporting effect is 
permitted, the predicted reported days-away injury rate rises back to 1.06, a 14% increase 
in reported injuries.  This suggests that unions are particularly vigilant regarding more 
serious injuries.  
 Furthermore, unions making the workplace safer leads to a slight increase in 
predicted light duty work (from 0.96 to 0.97), but the union-Hispanic reporting effect 
deters the shifting of workers from lost workday injuries to light duty (i.e., with the 
union-Hispanic interaction in play, the predicted light duty injury rate falls to 0.91).  
Thus, increased unionization rates make the workplace safer and deter the under-
reporting of injuries in the presence of Hispanics.  But holding the unionization rate 
constant introduces the question of the effect of an increased percentage of Hispanics. 
 In column 4, the percent Hispanic has been raised one standard deviation with a 
corresponding increase in the workers’ compensation Hispanic interaction but the union-
Hispanic reporting effect has again been restricted to the value in the base model.  Thus, 
under-reporting of injuries due to a one standard deviation increase in percent Hispanic 
(19 percentage points), but holding the union reporting effect constant, leads to a decline 
in all injury rates (e.g. predicted total injuries fall from 5.20 to 4.41), except in the case of 
light duty injuries, which rise from 0.96 to 1.07.  However, when the union-Hispanic 
reporting effect is permitted in column 5, predicted injury rates rebound upwards (e.g., 
reported total injuries rise from 4.41 to 4.82), except again in the case of light duty, which 
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falls back to 0.96.  In the case of the most serious injuries, the days-away-from-work 
predicted rate increases by 20.5% (from 1.32 to 1.59), when the union reporting effect is 
permitted after an assumed 19 percentage point increase in the percent of Hispanic 
workers.  Thus, increasing the percent of Hispanic workers leads to fewer reported 
injuries and more light duty injuries, but in the presence of unions, this under-reporting 
due to increased percentage of Hispanic workers is offset by from 6.5% to 20.5% due to 
the union reporting effect.  However, in the case of the predicted light duty injury rate 
,which had risen from 0.96 to 1.07 due to a standard deviation increase in the percent 
Hispanic, allowing the union reporting effect to take hold through the union-Hispanic 
interaction brings the predicted light duty rate back down to 0.96, the original predicted 
level in the base model.  The model suggests that unions strongly resist assigning more 
workers to light duty work when the workforce becomes increasingly Hispanic.  Thus, 
the presence of Hispanic workers leads to an under-reporting of injuries while the 
presence of unions substantially offsets this source of under-reporting. 
 Injuries are less likely to be reported where workers’ compensation costs are high.  
In column 6, I increase workers’ compensation rates by one standard deviation, but I 
restrict the interaction of workers’ compensation with percent Hispanic to the value in the 
base model.  In all cases but light duty injuries, the predicted injury rate rises with higher 
workers’ compensation.  However, as column 7 shows, when the interaction between 
workers’ compensation rates and the percent Hispanic is not restricted, these predicted 
reported injury rates subside somewhat (e.g., predicted total injuries which rise from 5.20 
to 6.15 with a standard deviation increase in workers’ compensation fall back to 5.84 
when the Hispanic under-reporting effect associated with higher workers’ compensation 
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is permitted to take effect).  Thus, the presence of Hispanics, in general, leads to under-
reporting, and at higher levels of workers’ compensation there is a modest additional 
amount of under-reporting for any given percentage of Hispanic workers. 
 In sum, higher percentages of Hispanic workers in state construction workforces 
leads to lower reported injury rates.  In general, a 19 percentage point increase in the 
percent Hispanic (one standard deviation in my data), will lead to a decline in reported 
injuries of 3 to 8%, across all injury types except light duty which are predicted to rise by 




SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 The focus of this dissertation has been an attempt to answer to what extent the 
presence of Hispanic workers contributes to under-reporting of injuries in the 
construction industry. 
 This question hinges on four distinct but interrelated topics: Hispanic workers, 
under-reporting, injuries, and construction. Previous research and literature has 
documented each topic separately, and some initiatives have documented two or more of 
the categories but none have aggregated them. Previous research investigated the under-
reporting phenomenon through the lens of reports by national monitoring agencies of 
workplace safety and injury rates. Such research has generally concluded the presence of 
the phenomenon and documented the severity in all of the national monitoring systems. 
Studies of this problem are very recent and very few, even very rare in construction, and 
specific data for Hispanic workers do not exist. Injury prediction is another well-
documented, contentious, and highly-debated topic because of its relation to risk and 
determining workers’ compensation insurance. Prediction of injuries was positively or 
negatively correlated to workers’ compensation. This heated debate over workers’ 
compensation and injuries was behind many reforms and deregulations in workers’ 
compensation laws during the past 2 decades. Many researchers argued that the presence 
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of higher workers’ compensation insurance rates created an increase in the reporting of 
injuries, where higher benefits increase workers’ incentives to report injuries-reporting 
effect. They have argued that injury numbers are a reflection of a reporting-effect moral 
hazard and are not real. Contrarily, some researchers argued that higher workers’ 
compensation insurance will increase an employer’s incentives to improve safety 
standards at the work site, decreasing overall injury rates. This is important for the 
employer because the higher the injury rate, the higher their workers’ compensation 
premium. These premiums are determined by the past history of a given employer’s 
injury rates, using what is known as the experience-rating mechanism.   
 Another debatable issue in injury determination is the role of unions. Compared to 
nonunion environments, unions usually enhance workers’ bargaining power and provide 
an institutional framework through which workers’ rights are protected. Therefore, we 
would expect that union workers, with their bargaining power and the plethora of 
information provided through union channels, will always report any kind of injury 
occurring during the course of work. We would conclude that under-reporting would be 
minimized in the case of unionized workers. In contrast, nonunion workers are more 
vulnerable and more easily manipulated by the employer to not report injuries. This 
correlates with the fact that such workers are often immigrants and, therefore, legally and 
linguistically handicapped.  These phenomena occur because under the workers’ 
compensation system the employer bears most of the insurance costs and the workers do 
not. If workers were to bear the cost of their injuries, under-reporting would not be a 
problem and an employer would not have incentives to not report injuries. Throughout 
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the literature there is evidence that unionized workers are more willing to report injuries 
than nonunionized ones simply because they are protected by the institution of the union. 
 Hispanics are the fastest growing sector of the population, and also the fastest 
growing percentage in the labor force among minorities. Their growth is especially 
evident in industries characterized as hazardous, where the nature of the jobs requires less 
skilled workers, and where work is more physically demanding, such as construction and 
agriculture among others. Their economic, demographic, and legal status makes them 
more vulnerable to employer retaliation when reporting any work-related injuries.  Given 
these considerations, we would predict Hispanic workers to suffer from under-reporting, 
and that is what this research has confirmed. Construction is among the most hazardous 
occupations in terms of reported fatal and nonfatal injuries.   
 Based on reports and data published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the 
trend of fatal and nonfatal injuries has apparently been declining over the past 3 decades. 
However, for some researchers this decline is fictional and does not reflect the reality of 
the workplace. This decline can be attributable to numerous factors such as improvement 
in safety standards, changes in OSHA recordkeeping, deregulation of workers’ 
compensation insurance, under-reporting, and misclassification of injuries. According to 
BLS officials, the explanation behind this decline is simply an increase in safety 
standards at the work site, ostensibly due to an increased awareness of OSHA rules and 
safety regulations. The decline is also due to employers’ fears of increased workers’ 
compensation costs resulting from workers suffering higher levels of injuries. This 
declining trend is very clear for the most serious and dangerous injuries, which require 
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missing some time from work. For example, there is a 70% decline in construction cases 
with days away from work between 1976 and 2008.  However, injuries with job transfer 
or restrictions and specifications of light duty work increased by approximately 700% 
during the same period. This provides a very convincing indication that the declining 
trend of injuries suggested by the BLS data is not actually due to increased safety, but 
due to reporting anomalies. Otherwise, why should we observe a sharp increase in injury 
rates with job transfer or restrictions? Another dubious indicator from the data relates to 
the question of whether or not the apparent trend may be attributable to increased safety 
standards, evident in the data for work-related fatalities among Hispanics. There is no 
doubt that increased safety standards and measures actually facilitated improved safety 
and reduction in injuries. But, there are other factors which need to be carefully examined 
to fully explain this trend.  
 In this dissertation safety was measured by including the year as an independent 
variable in the basic model to measure OSHA emphasis on safety standards in 
construction. This trend was significant at the 1% level, and the negative sign means that 
over time OSHA oversight enhanced safety at the workplace in construction and that it 
leads to a decrease in all type of injuries except for light duty injuries. Since 1992, the 
BLS started collecting and publishing data about fatalities in construction and all other 
industries according to racial and demographic characteristics. We see that overall 
fatalities declined but construction fatalities have increased since then. Fatalities among 
Hispanics increased during the same period. This fact casts doubt on the efficacy of 
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increased safety standards, and simultaneously leads to questions related to why 
Hispanics are dying at a higher rate in construction when compared to other groups.  
 To put things into more specific perspective, one can examine the features of the 
construction industry that shed some light on why under-reporting occurs. According to 
Philips (2003), the construction industry in the United States has the following defining 
characteristics: “turbulence, localness, custom production, and the structure of 
subcontracting in the construction markets” (p.161). The instability and the turbulence 
characteristic of the construction industry stem from weather and the influence of the 
business cycle, and changes in the interest rate, even when miniscule, like subtle shifts in 
the barometer, have large impacts. All these factors contribute to the volatility of the 
industry in responding to demand. These market dynamics explain the fluctuation in the 
numbers for employment and unemployment and the high labor turnover common in 
construction. Construction firms depend on local labor pools, and these reservoirs of 
labor change with the seasons, as does the demand for labor. At the peak of building 
season, high demand for labor attracts a workforce both less skilled and younger. Injuries 
and accidents inevitably increase. Another distinct feature of construction pertains to firm 
size; many construction firms are considered small in terms of the number of employees.  
This influences the relation between the worker and the proprietor of the owner of the 
firm. Other factors include the almost nomadic nature of the business, and the industry’s 
already disproportionate and still increasing reliance on racial and ethnic minorities, such 
as Hispanics, who are often noncitizens, as their main labor force. Most of the minorities 
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so employed are legally and linguistically disadvantaged, and their educational levels are 
often low, all of which subject them to numerous difficulties and potential exploitation.  
 These facets of the construction industry provide incentive and opportunity for 
under-reporting of any injury happening in the course of work. Employers know that 
these conditions favor them, and allow for exploitation of their workforce. Business 
leaders are tempted with ample enticements to under-report, manipulate, or minimize 
injury cases.  Furthermore, workers are likely to acquiesce to such decisions and practices 
out of fear of employer retaliation. For some, this might mean losing their jobs. As 
serious as loss of a job is, others face harsher punishments, including the possibility of 
deportation for those working illegally. Construction employees may be required not only 
to labor at their difficult jobs, but to work to obscure or down play their injuries. Added 
to that, there are bureaucratic obstacles that prevent the reporting of an injury or preclude 
satisfactory outcomes. There can be no doubt that under-reporting is a key aspect of the 
construction industry.  
 From an employer’s perspective, under-reporting is an important tool for avoiding 
the increasing cost of insurance premiums. The fewer injuries reported, the more his 
company history and past experience will appear to be clean and free of reported 
injuries—leading to favorable experience-ratings. The data of nonfatal injuries from the 
BLS with regard to construction show a puzzling trend, one which has to do with the 
behavior of different types of injuries. What we have seen is that total nonfatal injuries 
have declined over time, and also that injuries considered dangerous and requiring leave 
time are also declining, but at the same time, the incidence of less-severe injuries is 
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rising. Injuries can be deceptively reclassified from very serious to less serious. 
Employers may manipulate the reporting process to preserve their clean record of few 
serious injuries and thus maintain their desirable experience-rating.  Thus, their workers’ 
compensation rate and this misclassification of injuries may constitute another form of 
under-reporting. Employers may manipulate injury cases for less-advantaged or 
disadvantaged workers because of the relative impotence of those employees. Workers 
may become the victims of under-reporting because of their legal status, the 
inaccessibility of information about their rights, or language barriers.  Unions tend to 
mitigate many of these abuses, but here again we find that Hispanic workers are at risk. 
The data suggest that many of the workers—as in the case of foreign-born Hispanics—
who are among the most susceptible to being employed in high-risk jobs and the adverse 
effects of injury under-reporting—do not often enjoy recourse to unions.  
 Public officials contend that this decline in nonfatal injuries in construction and 
nearly all other industries owes its success to improved safety standards at the workplace. 
There is no doubt that safety improved in the construction workplace, but improved 
safety alone cannot explain the increase of less-severe injuries. If safety has increased, it 
should decrease all types of injuries across the board. Instead, we have seen a decrease 
only in the severest injuries, those that require an injured worker to take time off. This 
factor is very important in determining the future of the company because of its impact 
on experience-rating and the consequent financial burden when it comes to determining 
an insurance premium. This is a clear example of a moral hazard from the standpoint of 
an employer. Misclassified injuries and under-reporting as phenomena would not exist if 
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workers were responsible for their insurance (and any increases in premiums) when 
injured. Light duty injury rates are of great value to scholars. They can be used to observe 
how employers attempt to evade regulations and strive to maintain a clean record by 
minimizing their reports to national monitoring and reporting systems. Injuries that 
permit transfers to light duty work are relatively easy to conceal, compared to more 
serious ones that may be registered through a reporting channel such as OSHA logs or a 
union. 
 This research provides different nested models used for different types of injuries, 
along with a base model to be used as a reference point. The results from the base model 
are consistent with the previous empirical work that investigated the relation of injury 
determination. The dependent variable in the base model is total reported injuries and the 
other four types of injuries, all in the natural logarithm form. Independent variables are 
demographics and market variables without the Hispanic factor. The year has been used 
to measure the improvement of safety standards over time. The model predicted that 
improvement with a negative sign, meaning that over time safety standards improved, 
and so total injury rates declined. The presence of real workers’ compensation proved 
that employers are very sensitive to increased insurance rates, and so manipulating 
injuries through under-reporting and/or misclassifying them is to be considered. The 
regression analysis proved that the higher the workers’ compensation rate is, the lower 
the total injuries, except in case of light duty injuries. 
 Real average wage in construction and the average age of workers in construction 
both negatively predicted injury rates. These two variables reflect the idea that the more 
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experienced (measured in higher wages and higher average age) the worker is, the safer 
the workplace will be and the smaller the number of injuries will be. The research finding 
for the influence of firm size on injuries (measured by the employees per establishment 
variable) was mixed and insignificant. Previous research found that the larger a firm is, 
the smaller its reported injury rate was. This reflects the idea of an economy of scale, and 
the higher level of investments of those companies in safety standards. 
 The main goal of this research is to predict and investigate the influence of the 
presence of Hispanics in construction on under-reporting. The factor of the percentage of 
Hispanic workers was introduced to the basic model. As expected, once the Hispanic 
factor was introduced, it influenced all types of injuries significantly and negatively. This 
means that as the number of Hispanic workers in construction increased, the rate of 
reported injuries of all types decreased, except for light duty injuries. The rate of light 
duty injuries increased, but it was positive and insignificant. The positive sign of light 
duty means that some types of injuries are reclassified, and injured workers are 
reassigned to new and less demanding tasks. By reclassifying injuries from dangerous or 
moderate to light, the employer will guarantee that his workers’ compensation premium 
will not go up. This explanation is centered on the critical factor of increased number of 
Hispanic workers. Because they may fear losing their jobs, Hispanic workers are more 
willing to accept transfers to less demanding jobs—and that allows for under-reporting or 
not reporting any injury. 
 Another set of models that used the interaction term of percent of Hispanic 
workers with real workers’ compensation rate and unionization rate was introduced. 
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These models allowed for an investigation into how a higher unionization rate and a 
higher workers’ compensation rate in the presence of a higher percent of Hispanic 
workers will influence the reporting of all types of injuries. 
 The model shows that unionized Hispanic workers tend to be the most likely to 
report their injuries, and the least likely to be reclassified to light duty. The presence of 
unions in the model shows that the union will provide information and protect its 
members against any harassment by the employer when they report an injury. The results 
gave mixed signs for the different injury types, and they were statistically insignificant, 
except for light duty. Light duty was negatively related and insignificant regarding the 
interaction term of percent of Hispanic workers and the unionization rate. For the 
interaction term of percent Hispanics and real workers’ compensation rate, light duty 
injuries were positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. 
 The preceding chapter explained how workers’ compensation rates are 
determined based on the past experience of a company’s accident history—known as the 
“experience-rating.”  In this scheme any reported injury is costly to an employer. 
Employers seek to evade that expense through concealing injuries—sometimes in 
coerced collusion with employees—through reclassifying an injury or by not reporting it. 
If there are both Hispanic workers and high workers’ compensation rates, we expect any 
employer to under-report. The last model predicted that the sign of the interaction term of 
percent of Hispanic workers and workers’ compensation rate is negative and statistically 
significant for all types of injuries, except for light duty where it was positive and 
significant. This result indicates that under-reporting and reclassification of injuries from 
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serious to moderate, and from moderate to light, are very common when declaring these 
injuries is expensive to the employer. 
 This model can predict how the number of Hispanic workers impacts the behavior 
of reporting injuries. The model predicts a 3 to 8% decline in all types on injuries when 
the percentage of Hispanics is increased by about one standard deviation (about 19 
percentage points). Reporting light duty assignments will increase by about 3% for the 
same percentage point increase in Hispanics. 
 The main question of this research is to what degree does the presence of 
Hispanic workers contribute to under-reporting. The model predicts and confirms the 
existence of under-reporting.  The findings supported the existence of under-reporting 
when the percentage of Hispanic workers increases. The prediction is that if Hispanics 
increase by one standard deviation (19 percentage points), all injury types will decrease, 
except in case of light duty, and this is a very clear indication of under-reporting. The 
results suggest that under-reporting will be about 17.9% for all types of injuries (from 5.2 
to 4.41 per 100 worker), except for light duty, and under-reporting for the most 
dangerous jobs (days away from work) will be about 33.3%. At the same time, light duty 
injuries increase when the percentage of Hispanic workers increased, and this means that 
injuries have been reclassified. But when the reporting effect is permitted, injury rates 
rebound upward. For example, total injuries increased from 4.41 to 4.82 per 100 workers. 
This suggests that unions usually encourage workers to report their injuries, and this 
increase in injury rate is due to the union reporting effect. This fact is also supported by 
the increased rate of light duty injuries. So, the presence of Hispanics workers in the 
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work force will lead to under-reporting of all types of injuries except light duty, while at 
the same time the presence of unions will mitigate under-reporting when Hispanics 
increase by resisting any assignment of injured workers to light duty. 
 The second result predicted by the model concerns the influence of the increased 
presence of unions (to separate the reporting effect from the safety effect). This will help 
to separate the reporting effect from the safety effect that unions usually enhance. The 
literature shows that higher injury rates are usually associated with a higher degree of 
unionization, and this is known as the reporting effect. This model, in association with a 
one standard deviation increase in unions, while holding the interaction term of unions 
and percent Hispanics to the base model, the model predicted that all types of injuries, 
except light duty, would fall. The increased presence of unions leads to fewer injuries, 
and this result enhanced the idea of the role of unions in increasing safety at the 
workplace. If the union Hispanic reporting effect is permitted, total injury rates will 
rebound by 4.5%, and the rate of serious injuries (requiring days away from work) will 
increase by 14%. This shows that unions are more scrupulous in ensuring that this type of 
injury does not go ignored. 
 Finally, the model also confirmed the hypothesis regarding the workers’ 
compensation rate. If the workers’ compensation rate is increased by one standard 
deviation, predicted injury rates except for light duty increase. However, when the 
interaction between workers compensation and percent-Hispanic is not restricted to the 
base model, the injury rate decreased a little. This means that higher workers’ 
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compensation rates in the presence of a higher percentage of Hispanics exacerbate the 
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